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1 Introduction
Cheating has been a problem in multiplayer online video games since they were introduced.
To provide a good game experience, game developers had to develop systems to detect and
prevent cheating. These systems are collectively called anti-cheat programs. Building anti-
cheat systems has always been a cat-and-mouse game because new cheats are constantly
being developed to avoid detection by the game’s anti-cheat technology. Detecting newly
made cheat programs is the fundamental problem of anti-cheat development. For example,
if there is cheat-detection code in the game client and the cheaters discover a new way
to circumvent the detection, then the developer has to upgrade the anti-cheat again and
this cycle will repeat as long as the game is online and active. In this aspect, anti-cheat
development largely resembles anti-virus development.
Video games have become more and more popular and the businesses of many companies
revolve solely around their online games and the constant revenue that they generate. If a
game has a large number of cheaters, it can ruin the reputation of the game or even that of
the entire company, which can drive away other paying customers. The business impact of
not having a proper anti-cheat system can be very high, which makes cheat detection ever
more important. Nowadays many game tournaments also have prizes that range from tens
of thousands to millions of dollars, so it is increasingly necessary to ensure the fairness
of these competitions. Cheating can often unfairly influence the virtual economy of the
game. The creators of the cheating programs also sometimes sell their cheats to make
large amounts of money. Digital security company Irdeto reported in 2018 that 77% of
gamers surveyed in China reported that cheating in online games happens frequently and
68% of people surveyed in South Korea described the same [58]. As a result of widespread
cheating, the South Korean government took legislative action to make cheating officially
illegal and punishable with fines and prison time [28]. In addition to this, there have been
at least a hundred arrests of cheaters in China in 2018. These arrests were the result of
cooperation between the game company Tencent and the Chinese police [2].
A successful online game needs proper anti-cheat, and it is important to provide a metric for
evaluating different anti-cheat methods. This thesis will focus on comparing different anti-
cheat methods, both on the server-side and the client-side. The thesis will also investigate
combining server and client-side methods. Even though single-player games also have
cheating programs made for them, the work will only cover online games. Cheating in
single-player games is not interesting for this research as the effect of the cheating is only
limited to the player themselves. The thesis will look into the history and the current trends
of anti-cheat. By looking at the history of anti-cheat, the thesis will show what methods
have been used over time and whether they are still preferred in today’s video games.
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This work will shed light on why some methods have become increasingly popular at the
expense of other methods. The thesis will provide developers with valuable information
about the strengths and weaknesses of different anti-cheat methods. This knowledge will
help developers and other stakeholders decide what kind of anti-cheat system they should
implement for their games.
2 Methodology
Different anti-cheat methods will be evaluated in terms of resistance to tampering, ease
of implementation, lack of overhead, privacy, and suitability for a wide variety of games.
The techniques will be rated from 1 to 4 in all categories. A higher score means that the
method is better in the selected criterion.
Resistance to tampering will evaluate how difficult it is to bypass the examined anti-cheat
method. This evaluation will take into account the different skill levels of cheaters and the
skills required to bypass the anti-cheat. The evaluation is relevant because the developers
need to be able to determine if it is worthwhile to even apply the method or whether it
should be applied in conjunction with some other method.
Ease of implementation will weigh the skills needed to implement the selected anti-cheat
technique. It will include considerations of the development time and other resources
that may be required. Because many smaller companies are developing online games, it is
useful to consider whether specialized expertise is required to implement an anti-cheat
method and if it is worth it in relation to other anti-cheat techniques. Many companies
might need to hire developers with special expertise in these areas, and the benefit has to
be justified.
The lack of overhead will consider how much the anti-cheat method affects the functionality
of the game in terms of performance, which in this case means the frame rate and latency
in the game. If there is a high possibility of a method having an effect on the game
performance, a lower score will be given.
The non-invasiveness angle will evaluate if an anti-cheat method is a risk to the privacy
of the users. Often invasiveness means scanning personal data in the users’ computers
or other actions that can jeopardize the users’ privacy. The evaluation will also consider
whether the data gathered by the anti-cheat could be misused. People are getting more
and more privacy-conscious online and an invasive anti-cheat can affect the reputation of
the game; as such, the developers will need to be able to evaluate if it is still worthwhile
to apply the selected technique.
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Suitability for a wide variety of games will score the method based on it being general
enough so that it can be applied to many different game types instead of only fitting
a certain type of game. Developers need to be able to know whether a method is a
good fit for their game and if the same anti-cheat system can be used for other games
under development. How widely a certain method is applied today will not be used as
an indicator because many games use prebuilt anti-cheat systems that rely on the same
approaches. It is also very hard to accurately estimate how many games use certain
anti-cheat techniques because the anti-cheat systems are often proprietary and it is in the
interests of the developers to conceal the methods they use.
Most commercial anti-cheat software is proprietary, and the developers want to protect
their trade secrets, so the solutions examined in this thesis will be based on public research
and academic literature. Graphs and charts will be used to illustrate concepts and example
code will be provided as needed. Third-party tools will be used in the reverse engineering
and packet capturing section.
Ghidra is a cross-platform tool that was developed by the National Security Agency (NSA)
for reverse engineering all types of binaries [19]. It will be used as the main reverse
engineering tool when inspecting the game binary.
WireShark is a widely used open-source cross-platform tool for inspecting network traffic
and capturing packets [62]. It will be used to examine the traffic between the game client
and the server.
A small game was specifically developed for this thesis in order to test different anti-cheat
systems and will be used to show how to implement the different methods and how they
affect cheating. The use of an example game will provide valuable real-world data to
evaluate various anti-cheat methods. In the end, both literature and data provided by
the game will be used to draw conclusions about the viability of the many anti-cheat
approaches. It would of course be even better to analyze real-world games but most
multiplayer games are many gigabytes in size and have many layers of complexity, which
means that it would take an enormous amount of time to go through and analyze them.
This would derail the thesis from its main topic. The use of real games as examples
instead of the purpose-built example game is also problematic in the legal sense, which
gives another reason to use a custom game specifically developed for this thesis. Our small
game cannot be used as an example in all the methods, however. For instance, making a
kernel-based anti-cheat driver would be worth an entire thesis by itself, and the low-level
implementation details would vary between the different operating systems. All code and
tests for the small game were run on macOS Mojave 10.14.4, but there should be no issues
with other platforms because all the tools are also available for Windows and Linux-based
systems. Simple and Fast Multimedia Library (SFML) is used for the game’s graphics
3
rendering and networking, so SFML is required to build the game server and client.
2.1 Example game client and server
The example game consists of the client and the server. The idea of the game is that the
server decides on a random number between zero and one hundred and the players try to
guess this number turn by turn. After a player attempts a guess, if the result is wrong
then the players are told whether the guess was too high or too low, and then the turn
goes to the next player. Every match has three players and the first player to guess the
number wins the game. In the course of the thesis, parts of the code in the game will be
referred to and some parts will be edited and compared with the original version to give a
fact-based illustration of effects that different systems have.
Figure 1: Architecture of the example game
Figure 1 represents the architecture and the flow of the game. In the step “1. Authentication
request”, the user types his username and presses enter, which causes the client to send
an authentication request to the server. The server checks this request, and in step
“2. Authentication token” the server assigns a unique token to the client which is used
for further communications and for distinguishing the players from each other. In step
“3. Authentication request”, the client confirms its authentication status by sending the
received token to the server and the server marks the client as authenticated, which means
that it can join the matchmaking. In step “4. Join matchmaking”, the client sends a
message to the server telling that it wants to be placed in the matchmaking queue. The
server then adds the player in matchmaking. The step “5. Create match” occurs when
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there are at least three players in the matchmaking queue. The server takes these three
players out of the queue and creates a match between them. The creation of the match
involves generating the number that the players have to guess and informing the clients
that a match is starting. In step “6. Give match info and start game”, the server sends an
indication to the client that the game has begun and the client changes to the game screen.
The final step “7. Gameplay loop” is the main game loop that consists of messaging
between the client and the server. At the start of the game loop, the first player guesses
the number and the server checks whether the number was correct or not. If the number
was not correct, then the server informs all players if the number was too high or too low.
After this, the turn moves to the next player and the cycle repeats until someone guesses
the right number, which starts a new round with a newly generated random number.
3 History of anti-cheat in video games
The history of cheating in multiplayer video games goes back at least to the 1980s, but it
is hard to pinpoint the first anti-cheat system, especially in online games. Ultima Online
was the first massively multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) that became
popular in the western part of the world, and even today it has a fair number of players
[31]. The current daily player count is estimated to be around 5,000 in the official servers
[52]. This is not the whole truth, however, because many players also play on private
unofficial servers that have no reliable player data available. There is not much public
information about the anti-cheat system in Ultima Online, but it did not have a client-side
anti-cheat at all. However, most of the game logic was handled on the server-side, so
cheating was not trivial. Client-side cheats such as keeping the game clock always on
daytime were easy to implement due to the lack of client-side anti-cheat, but they did
not affect other players. Later on, players discovered bugs that cheats could exploit to
gain in-game benefits such as money and resources. For example, in 2017 online magazine
Vice interviewed a man who had made his living for 20 years by cheating in games and
selling the gained goods on eBay and Chinese marketplaces. In the article, the man states
that his career began with Ultima Online where he tried to find weaknesses in the game
protocol that allowed for unintended actions. In 1997, he managed to find an exploit that
allowed him to delete other players’ houses and take them over. The man ended up selling
the houses for an average price of 2,000 dollars per house [16].
As online games became more and more popular, cheating also got more sophisticated
and anti-cheat systems followed the trend. The first major commercial anti-cheat was
PunkBuster, which was developed by Tony Ray’s company Even Balance after he had bad
experiences with cheaters in the game Team Fortress Classic. A few years after the initial
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release of PunkBuster, it was used in about 80% of the matches in the popular shooting
games such as Return to Castle Wolfenstein and Quake III [7]. PunkBuster is integrated
in both the game client and the game server. The PunkBuster client performs various
functions such as real-time scanning of the memory. The client tries to find cheats from
the memory and compare them to signatures in a built-in database. The client can also
calculate MD5 checksums of the files and send them to the server to validate whether the
files are modified. If a player gets caught cheating in one server that uses PunkBuster, he
is banned from all servers using PunkBuster. PunkBuster also has an option for hardware
bans that can calculate hardware ID from a computer’s components and block the player
based on that [38].
Shortly after the introduction of PunkBuster, the game company Valve rejected Even
Balance’s offer to use PunkBuster in their games and started to work on their own
long-term anti-cheat solution to respond to the cheating epidemic in their Counter-Strike
first-person shooter game. The problem of cheating was becoming consistently worse and
players were quitting the game as a result [41]. The main cheating method was the use of
a “wallhack”, which meant that the cheaters could see other players through walls. This
gave an unfair advantage to the cheaters as it allowed them to exploit the knowledge of
other players’ positions and get favorable shooting positions. For example, the cheater
might look where the enemy is and go behind them and shoot them in the back. Wallhack
is often implemented by modifying the game engine to render walls with semi-transparent
textures.
In 2002, Valve Anti-Cheat (often referred to as VAC) was finally deployed in Counter-Strike
[34]. The basic idea of the Valve Anti-Cheat is very similar to Even Balance’s PunkBuster
system. Valve Anti-Cheat can detect cheats such as OpenGL graphics hacks that were
often used for implementing wallhacks. Anti-cheat systems have also had their fair share of
scandals, often related to the way they scan and send information about users’ computers.
For instance, in 2014 it was reported the Valve Anti-Cheat accessed the DNS cache on the
users’ computers and sent back data about it. Gabe Newell, the CEO of Valve, had to
clarify that the DNS cache was accessed in order to catch kernel-level cheats that contacted
DRM servers to verify whether the user had actually paid to use the cheat or not. He also
said that this method was only used for thirteen days until the cheat producers discovered
it and started to manipulate the DNS cache of their customers. Newell stated that during
those thirteen days, 570 cheaters were banned by using this technique. In his explanation,
Newell also noted that VAC tries to look like a scary and opaque system in order to
make attacks against it more difficult [32]. This is commonly known as security through
obscurity. The idea is further enforced by the fact that VAC does not immediately ban
cheaters but instead marks them to be banned after a certain amount of time has passed.
This makes it harder for cheaters and cheat developers to pinpoint the exact action that
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caused the ban.
World of Warcraft was released by the game company Blizzard Entertainment in 2006
and it quickly became the most popular MMORPG game of all time. This meant that it
also became a big target for cheaters. Blizzard had bad experiences with cheaters from
their previous games, and in World of Warcraft they decided to develop a comprehensive
anti-cheat system. The anti-cheat system used in World of Warcraft is called Warden and it
is also used in other Blizzard games. Warden has also had its own scandals. In 2006, it was
accused of scanning players’ browser history and cookies. Privacy advocates argued that
Blizzard had no right or need to access this kind of highly private data [25]. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) branded Blizzard’s Warden as a spyware program. Software
engineer Greg Hoglund managed to disassemble the code of Warden and confirmed that
it was scanning running programs and checking them against known cheating programs.
Hoglund also reported that Warden scans things like title bars of open programs. It also
sent text strings such as emails back to Blizzard [57].
In November 2006, it was reported that many Linux users were mistakenly banned by
Warden when it detected Cedega as a cheat program. Cedega is a Linux application that
is meant for running Windows applications in a Linux environment, and many Linux
gamers used it to run World of Warcraft. These kind of mistakes are called false positives.
Blizzard acknowledged the error and restored the banned accounts 20 days later [51]. The
Cedega false positive illustrates the difficulty of developing anti-cheat systems, as there
are many programs that might exhibit cheat-like behavior such as rendering graphics on
top of the game. For example, many voice chat programs have an option to display an
in-game overlay on top of the game, and initially many of these programs were falsely
classified as cheats when the overlay option was enabled. It can be hard for the developer
to discern a hack that draws graphics on top of the game from a legitimate program that
does so.
The three anti-cheat systems covered here all share similarities in function and all of
them were developed as a response to a big cheating epidemic. All of them scan the
running programs on the user’s computer and perform various kinds of analysis. Since
all three programs are commercial and their source code is not available, we cannot read
the code itself and know exactly what these programs are doing and how they are doing
it. However, the big picture about the history of anti-cheat is clear. New solutions were
built as responses to problems that were driving many players away. The main method
was having a client-side anti-cheat program that scanned the local computer and sent
information to the server. The privacy issues about anti-cheat systems were raised with
both VAC and Warden, and these issues are still relevant today.
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The privacy viewpoint has been a large factor of influence in the development of modern
anti-cheat methods [55].
4 Existing research in anti-cheat methods
Explicit academic research of different anti-cheat methods is relatively sparse. This may
be due to low academic interest in the topic; it might also be due to the fact that most
anti-cheat research in the private sector is proprietary, as the companies rely on secrecy
to ensure that the anti-cheat is hard to circumvent. If companies published detailed info
about their anti-cheat methods, it could compromise the security of their games. While
there is not much academic research in the anti-cheat space, companies such as Riot Games
have published blog posts and talks about their anti-cheat systems on a general level [56].
These posts provide valuable information for research. Some research also focuses directly
on the methods that are utilized in cheat detection and prevention. For instance, this
thesis references many papers that cover more broad computer security related issues like
man-in-the-middle attacks and memory encryption [50][36].
Many websites dedicated to cybersecurity, such as Hackmag, detail various attempts to
reverse engineer proprietary anti-cheat systems [8]. The authors who post their findings
usually do so under a nickname because they do not want to be identified and possibly
face legal consequences from the game companies. The legal consequences can be a major
factor why people are reluctant to publish information related to anti-cheat systems,
especially if these findings are in any way related to any commercial product. The authors
of anti-cheat related content often work full-time on the software field and are interested in
computer security, but they are often not academics and, as such, do not have an interest
in publishing their findings in academic research papers.
Because of the low amount of existing research directly related to game anti-cheat, this
thesis draws heavily on papers and books related to computer security. It also uses news
articles, anti-cheat-related content posts, and whitepapers from various authors. All these
resources, combined with the custom game and benchmarks, provide valuable information
to compare different anti-cheat methods.
5 Categorization of cheat methods
Video game cheats can be divided into different categories based on how they exploit the
game. In this thesis, the different methods are divided into categories of soft and hard
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cheats. Approaches against all of these cheats in different categories will be covered in
the thesis, but the main focus will be on hard cheats that utilize external programs in
cheating. For example, a cheat could manipulate how game textures are drawn and give
the player the ability to see through walls. In the context of this thesis, it is important
to understand the difference between soft and hard cheats as well as how different cheat
techniques are classified.
The type of the game can also influence what kind of cheating is relevant. For instance,
utilizing secret game data and automated tools in first-person shooting games is considered
heavy cheating and are very detrimental to the game. However, utilizing secret game data
and automated tools would not be that interesting in turn-based games because of the
slow pace of the game; in these instances, the game was likely designed so that there would
be no secret game data. In turn-based games, looking at packet modification and spoofing
could prove to be more relevant.
It is important to distinguish the effects of cheating on the game company and other
players. Things that might be unfair towards the game company might not always be
unfair towards the other players. However, cheating that is unfair towards the other players
usually affects the game company indirectly when the players start to quit the game due
to the unfairness. For example, if some players use wallhacks to see through walls, the
other players will quickly perceive this as unfair and quit the game which would cause
losses to the company. In this thesis all forms of cheating are covered but usually the
damage of cheating is evaluated from the viewpoint of the game company.
5.1 Soft cheats
Soft cheats are cheating methods that utilize game mechanics in order to gain an unfair
advantage over other players. These can be things like mechanics that were not intended
by the game developers, such as quick ways to make money in the game. In essence, soft
cheats cover all unintended use of game mechanics in order to gain benefits. The End-user
license agreements (EULA) of the games usually contain a clause that disallows the unfair
use of game mechanics. For example, the EULA of the game company Blizzard disallows
the use of any in-game bugs that would grant an advantage over other players [1]. This
type of broad clause covers all exploits as it would be impossible to list every possible case
in the EULA. Soft cheats are hard to fight against by anti-cheat methods because they do
not tamper with the game client or do things that differ from ordinary gameplay. Soft
cheats also do not use any external programs such as tools that press keys and move the
mouse to automate functionality. The main way to counter soft cheats is by thorough
testing of the game before releasing it on the market. Games will also need continuous
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updates to fix exploitable loopholes.
5.1.1 Bugs and exploits
Bugs and exploits are often categorized as cheats because they provide functionality that
was not intended by the game developer. For instance, in a role-playing game there
could be a situation where a character could buy an item from a shop and then sell it to
the same shop for a higher price. This behavior would obviously be unintended by the
developer because when repeated multiple times, it would provide the player with a source
of unlimited money. To exploit this bug, the players do not need to use any cheating
techniques as they can just use the game client to buy and sell the item repeatedly. This
thesis discusses ways to prevent these kinds of exploits from being made, but they are not
the focus of anti-cheat systems as they purely work by utilizing existing game mechanics
without any external programs. For example, in the game Destiny 2, players found a
bug that would allow them to use a certain weapon in an unintended way to make their
characters very powerful. The knowledge of this exploit spread and later the developers
removed the weapon from the game to fix the bug [15].
5.1.2 Exchanging real money for in-game goods and services
Using real money to buy in-game goods and services is often considered cheating unless
the game developer explicitly allows it in the game rules. Buying game services or goods
with real money breaks the game economy and offers an unfair advantage in relation to
other players. This kind of cheating is hard to detect because the real money transactions
take place outside the game services, and the cheater gets the items in-game after the
transaction is made. It is very hard to prove a link between these actions compared to just
giving items away in the game for free. Even though this type of cheating is classified as
soft cheating, there are ways to use statistical data analysis on the server to find suspected
cheaters. For instance, all player actions can be logged and suspicious events can be
searched from the logs by automated tools.
Account sharing is also increasingly common in many games. Shady companies often sell
services such as character levelling or using your character to do some in-game tasks that
would consume a large amount of time. These services are paid with real money, and then
the password and username is given to the company to login to the service and complete
the purchased tasks, which might take up to many weeks [10]. This kind of account sharing
usually violates games’ terms of service agreements and is considered cheating as it gives
an unfair advantage to the player who buys these services. There are also concerning
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reports from Asia about prisoners being forced to play World of Warcraft to earn gold
and sell it for real money [48].
The main method against this type of cheating is extensive logging and retroactive
inspection of the logs. Geographic restrictions can also be used.
5.2 Hard cheats
Hard cheats are cheating methods that anti-cheat systems are mainly developed to counter.
Often when cheating is discussed in an everyday setting, it exclusively refers to these
approaches. For example, hard cheats could be programs that edit the game client or
modify the packets that the game client sends out. External cheat programs could also
inject themselves into the game’s memory space and create new functionality by calling
the functions of the game.
5.2.1 Bots and other automated tools
Bots and other automated tools are programs that automate playing certain or all parts of
the game. Bots can be roughly classified into three types: ones that read the image from
the screen and simulate keyboard and click events, ones that inject code into the game
client in order to control the game, and ones that control the game by sending packets to
the server pretending to be the actual game client. The first method, which only simulates
keyboard and mouse clicks, could also be classified as a soft cheat, but it is classified as
a hard cheat because it uses external programs to simulate the input. For example, a
program can automate killing enemies in a game and be left to run day and night for a
week, which would grant an unfair advantage against those players that can only play the
game limited hours per day. For instance, World of Warcraft players can write macros that
automate small functionalities of the game, but these macros are limited by the game API.
However, with cheats the player can unlock all the limitations and write very complex
macros in the game that automate gameplay to a large extent [8].
5.2.2 Utilizing secret game data
Utilizing secret game data means using data from the client that is not meant to be seen
by the player. For instance, all player locations could be located in the game memory
even though they are not meant to be shown to the player except in certain circumstances.
Now the cheat program could read the game memory and extract these locations for the
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player to see. The cheater could also capture the packets and read the player location data
directly instead of reading the game memory. Preventing this kind of cheating requires
smart design of the application protocol and considerations about what information needs
to be in the memory. Detecting memory scanning tools and encrypting the data in the
memory are also possible solutions.
5.2.3 Packet modification and replay attacks
Packet modification refers to editing the data in the packets that are sent to the game
server. For example, the cheater could feed the server with false movement data or exploit
a badly designed application protocol where the server blindly trusts the data that arrives
from the client. Malladi et al. define replay attack as an attack on a security protocol that
uses replay of messages from a different context into the intended context, thereby fooling
the honest participants into thinking that they have completed the protocol run successfully.
They also split replay attacks into two categories: run-internal and run-external where
the origin of messages defines the category of the attack [27]. In common terms, replay
attack refers to an attack where a packet is copied and sent over and over again to the
server. This thesis will cover run-external replay attacks where the game client tries to
send replicated packets to the server. For example, a player could cast a spell on another
player in a game and then replay the spell cast packet multiple times, which would make
the other player lose the fight. If the server was badly designed, this type of attack could
make the cheater very powerful.
5.2.4 Spoofing
Spoofing in the context of cheating in video games means pretending to be someone else
and using that to exploit the game. For example the cheater could attempt to send packets
and make it look like some other player was sending them instead. This could be done
by editing the packet data to make it look like it was coming from someone else. In a
very badly made video game this could mean that a player could give someone money
in the game and then spoof the packet so that the server would think that someone is
actually giving the cheater money. Spoofing is possible because the IP protocol itself does
not specify any method to validate the authenticity of the source of the packet [49]. This
means that the anti-spoofing measures have to be taken on the transport layer and further
on in the application layer. Preventing this kind of cheating requires the game developer
to implement a way to verify that the packet is really from the source that it claims to be
from.
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6 Server-side anti-cheat methods
Anti-cheat methods can be broken into two categories: server-side and client-side methods.
Server-side methods work only on the game server itself and rely on things such as checking
incoming packets and ensuring that the data and game state are correctly handled on
the server. Client-side methods are things such as anti-cheat programs that operate on
the client machine and send data back to the server. This chapter will take a broad
look at four different ways to prevent cheating on the server-side: not trusting the client,
designing a tampering resistant application protocol, obfuscating the network traffic, and
statistical methods. These techniques will be analyzed from the perspective of ease of
implementation, overhead, suitability for different types of games, and how easy it is for
cheaters to circumvent these methods.
6.1 Do not trust the client
Not trusting the client is an essential part of designing an online game in which it is hard
to cheat. In fact, verifying data from clients is an essential part of any online service
design. For example, if the game client sends a packet that tells the server that the player
is trying to sell an item to a shop, the server should not blindly trust the message and
perform the sell operation which would give the player money. Instead, the server should
perform all the necessary checks such as whether the player actually has the item and if
the player is in the right location.
Not trusting the client might seem an obvious design choice, but many online services can
have vulnerabilities where data is not correctly verified. For example, a mobile turn-based
online strategy game could have the battles fought on the local device and then send the
results of the battles to the server that blindly trusts the data. In this situation, the game
developers could have calculated that it is worthwhile to save server and network resources
by not having the battles simulated and fought on the server. However, this design decision
paves the way for cheating by modifying the client and sending false results to the server.
Developers may also believe that mobile devices are more secure than computers and thus
harder to use for cheating. While this is true in some sense, it does not mean that mobile
devices are immune to cheating. For instance, the iPhone’s and iPad’s iOS operating
system is more closed than Windows or macOS, but it is still possible to open the system
and modify the game client. If the network traffic is not obfuscated, this type of attack
can be executed just by intercepting the packets and modifying the packet data on the fly
without even touching the game client itself.
Figure 2 demonstrates a situation where a server is vulnerable to being fed false data by
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Figure 2: Protocol vulnerable to packet or client tampering
the client. For example, the cheater could edit the BattleResult packet and change the
DidWin part to true instead of false. Alternatively, the client could just be modified in a
way that it always sends a packet that indicates a battle was won regardless of whether it
was really won or lost. In Figure 2, the game server blindly trusts the result from the client,
and the server has no way of knowing the real status because the fight is only simulated in
the local machine. This type of flaw is very easy to take advantage of, especially in cases
where there is no anti-cheat on the client-side.
Figure 3 shows an improved protocol that does not trust anything other than input actions
coming from the client; the battle is simulated solely on the server-side, and the client just
displays the battle for the client. In this scenario, there is nothing that can be modified in
the client in order to cheat the server; packet modification will not be useful because the
only data sent to the server are actions such as move or attack. As can be seen from the
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Figure 3: Protocol that is not vulnerable to packet editing
figure, the client sends an ATTACK action to the server and the server responds with the
result. If the client edits the action packet, it does not matter because the actions are just
inputs that tell the server how to proceed with the simulation. In essence, by editing the
action packet the cheater can just change one possible action to another possible action
because impossible actions are rejected by the server.
When evaluating not trusting the client as an anti-cheat method, certain trade-offs have
to be taken into consideration. If the server was to run all the battle simulations, the
network traffic would increase manifold because all actions would be sent to the server and
the results sent back to the client. The server would also need much more resources to
simulate possibly hundreds of thousands of battles at the same time. In some parts of the
world, such as Southeast Asia, internet connections can be unreliable and expensive, which
would make playing the game more unpleasant and possibly impossible for some users [24].
If the game is targeted at these markets, it could be justified to design the protocol as
presented in Figure 2 and instead rely heavily on other anti-cheat measures.
The number guessing game, which was specifically made for this thesis, can be used to
15
demonstrate the real-world effects of not validating the game state and blindly trusting
the user input. In the game, when a user types a number and presses enter, a packet with
the structure displayed in Figure 4 is generated. The only data fields in the packet are
the opcode, match id, authentication token, and the guessed number. The server uses the
token to confirm the identity of the player and to check whether it is the player’s turn to
make a guess. If this check was not there, and the server solely relied on the client-side
user interface to determine whether a client would be allowed to send a guess or not, the
client could easily do a replay attack by replicating captured guess number packets and
changing the guessed number or directly reverse engineer the game user interface to allow
the guessing of a number on other players’ turns.
Figure 4: Packet that is sent when player guesses a number
If we want to test whether a game would be vulnerable to this type of attack, first we
would find a packet that contains the number we are trying to guess. The number has to
be in the packet in order for the server to validate the guess. With WireShark, we can
turn on the packet capture and guess a number in the game. In this situation, the server
and the client are on the same computer in the same network, so we have to examine the
loopback traffic instead of Wi-Fi or Ethernet because the packets never enter those. In a
real-world situation, the packets would travel over the Ethernet or Wi-Fi and we would
look into those adapters instead. The packet structure would remain the same.
In WireShark’s packet capture, we can notice a burst of packets right after guessing a
number in the game. Figure 5 shows these five packets. We can look into the first packet
and search for the number that we guessed. In this example, the number was 54 (which
translates to 0x36 in hex). In order to test this method in the guessing game, we have
to temporarily remove the check for the player that has the turn. For the purpose of
this example, we remove the check if (guesser == match->GetCurrentTurnPlayer())
from the game server code so the server blindly trusts the client. The game client and
server code can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B.
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Figure 5: Burst of packets related to the game
In Figure 6, we can see 36 at the end of the packet data after a long padding of zeroes.
We can suspect this packet is the one that we are looking for. There are a number of ways
to resend a similar packet with different guess numbers. In this example, we write a small
Node.js based script that takes in the data as bytes and then edits the last two bits on
every iteration to test a different number.
Figure 6: Data inside the first packet
1 const dgram = requ i r e ( ’ dgram ’ ) ;
2 const socket = dgram . c r ea t eSocke t ( ’ udp4 ’ ) ;
3
4 const data = [
5 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x05 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x1e ,
6 0x73 , 0x6d , 0x79 , 0x63 , 0x74 , 0x75 , 0x75 , 0x67 ,
7 0x63 , 0x74 , 0x65 , 0x67 , 0x69 , 0x6d , 0x6d , 0x6a ,
8 0x67 , 0x79 , 0x67 , 0x79 , 0x76 , 0x71 , 0x63 , 0x6c ,
9 0x78 , 0x6a , 0x74 , 0x75 , 0x65 , 0x66 , 0x00 , 0x00 ,
10 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x00 , 0x36
11 ] ;
12
13 f o r ( var num = 0 ; num <= 100 ; num++) {
14 data [ data . length −1] = num;
15 socke t . send ( Buf f e r . from ( data , ’ hex ’ ) , 5500 , ’ 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 ’ , ( e r r ) => {}) ;
16 }
Listing 1: Script that guesses multiple numbers in a row
The script in Listing 1 sends packets that try to guess the number for all numbers from
zero to one hundred. On every iteration of the for-loop, the last byte is replaced with the
number from the for-loop. In this way, the packets are sent to the server, and at some
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point, the right number is hit; thus the sender wins the game. In this example, the method
is easy to implement because the packets are not encrypted, nor is there any check on
the order of packets or whether a certain packet has arrived or not. Even if these checks
were present and the packets were encrypted, exploiting the trust of the server would
still be possible but more time consuming as the encryption algorithm would have to be
reverse-engineered and packets given the correct order numbers. The only way to fight
against this type of cheating is to build the server so that the game state is always tracked
and the content of every packet is always verified.
Based on this section, not trusting the client should be a basic building block of any
anti-cheat solution unless there are very specific and important concerns why the message
from the client should be trusted directly without running and evaluating the game state
on the server. One special reason is that simulating lots of stuff on the server can be more
expensive and will cause more overhead depending on what things need to be verified.
However, utilizing cloud computing has greatly reduced costs and made it possible to
quickly deploy additional resources should they be needed, so there are fewer and fewer
reasons to build solutions that trust the client without verification. The example with
the guessing game clearly illustrates the possibility of exploiting a weakness in the server
and using it to win the game. The demonstration also displayed how simple this kind
of attack can be. In addition, it showed that a single line of code if (guesser ==
match->GetCurrentTurnPlayer()) could have prevented this attack.
In terms of resistance to tampering, not trusting the client ranks very high because as
shown here, the data verification is done on the server side and thus it is very hard to
exploit.
When looking at the ease of implementing the game in a server authoritative way, it is
not very straightforward as it requires verifying all parts of the game so that no client
info is directly trusted. Especially if the developers are modifying an existing game, it
can take a lot of work to upgrade the game so that all information is verified. Even then
the programmers might miss something and leave in critical exploits. If the game was
designed from ground up to not have the simulation done on the server side, it might be
too time-consuming and difficult to fully change the architecture of the game.
When it comes to overhead, the solution cannot be given the highest score because verifying
all types of data that comes from the client increases the processing time on the server.
However, the overhead is dependent on the amount of data and also on the processing
power of the server, so in the best case scenario it may be a non-issue.
In terms of privacy, not trusting the client is a good anti-cheat method as it does not
interfere with anything on the client machine.
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When looking at the suitability for different types of games, the method is widely applicable
to various types of games, although it is more suitable for slower games, such as strategy
games, that do not need to send large amounts of data continuously.
Overall, building a server, that accurately keeps track of the game state, makes the fight
against cheating much easier and also reduces the need for other types of anti-cheat
methods. Server-client design, that does not trust the client without checks, provides a
solid foundation for any type of anti-cheat solution.
6.2 Designing a tampering resistant application protocol
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [54], Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [39], and the
protocols below them are responsible for the delivery of the messages between the client
and the server. Application protocol encompasses the packet structure, what kind of data
is sent in different types of situations, and how the data is handled on both the client
and the server. The tampering resistant application protocol is viewed as a server-side
anti-cheat method because all the packet verification is done on the server-side even though
the client-side also uses the protocol. Despite UDP and TCP being on the lower layers, the
choice between them will affect how the application protocol is built. While this chapter
focuses on the application protocol that the developer can affect, in theory, the cheating
could happen on any layer of the protocol stack, such as the IP protocol layer.
Most games tend to use UDP as a network protocol and implement some of the TCP
functionality in their own application protocols. However, there are famous games that
use TCP, such as World of Warcraft [46]. Peer-to-peer games have their own unique issues
related to their distributed nature but they will not be covered in this thesis due to its
focus on the more popular client-server paradigm. A vulnerable application protocol can
cause heavy damage to the game in the form of cheating but also in the form of data
theft. For example, Valve’s popular Source Engine contained a memory corruption bug
that could be exploited with fragmented packets. This vulnerability was caused by too
small of a heap buffer that was assigned to hold the entire packet. The checks done on the
packet’s POS and LEN fields were also faulty. This vulnerability allowed the cheater to
use fragmented packets to overflow the buffer and execute malicious code [3].
Firstly the developers need to decide whether to choose UDP or TCP. The TCP was
designed for bulk transfers and as such is not very widely used in online games. It was
reported that TCP can often cause an unneeded delay in video games due to the way
games work by continuously sending data that did not exist before. For example, in
TCP if an earlier packet is delivered unsuccessfully then the following packets will get
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blocked. This phenomenon can cause delays that would not happen with UDP. When it
comes to anti-cheat, TCP provides useful out-of-the-box functionality like packet sequence
numbering. This means that if the cheater tries a replay attack by simply resending
packets, the cheat will not work because TCP will notice that a packet with the same
sequence number has already been received. In the case of UDP, this kind of protection
would have to be implemented by the developer. In comparison to UDP, it would also be
much harder for the cheater to inject fake packets into the stream because they would
need to have the correct sequence numbers on TCP [39].
Figure 7: Possible UDP packet structure in an online game
Figure 7 represents an example UDP packet structure in an online game. In this case
the developer has chosen to use UDP but build a TCP-like functionality on top of the
UDP protocol. This is commonly known as TCP over UDP. The structure of the packet
in Figure 7 is as follows:
1. TCP-related data contains information that TCP packets normally contain
such as sequence numbers.
2. Lag compensation data contains time-related information such as the time
when the packet was sent by the server. This data can be utilized to make
calculations about the game latency. It can also be taken into account when
evaluating things such as character movement.
3. The protocol data can contain miscellaneous data that the developers have
chosen to use for the protocol. For example, this can be things like data
reliability hashes.
4. Game data is actual data of the packet. This can be anything related to
the game such as character movement data, enemy health data or account
information.
Auriemma and Ferrante state in their paper that many games often fail to properly verify
the headers of the fragmented packets which can allow the cheater to send in malformed
packets. They also highlight that when searching for game vulnerabilities, the packets are
often a good place to look at [3]. For example, cheaters could edit the data in the (3) lag
compensation portion of the packet and fool the server into thinking that there is more
latency than there is.
Whether the developer chooses to use TCP or UDP, the most important part of a smart
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application protocol is sending only information that is needed and nothing else. For
example, many games have a minimap that shows the players that are close to you, which
means that the locations of these players have to be stored inside the game memory. In a
badly designed application protocol, the memory would not only contain the locations of
the nearby players that are displayed on the minimap, but all the players, even those that
are not displayed. This implies that a smart cheater could either get these non-displayed
player locations from the packets themselves or dig them up from the game memory.
Designing an application protocol that does not send any extra information is not always
possible due to other constraints like the speed of the game and latency. For instance,
in many shooting games it is necessary to react quickly to a player that comes around
the corner and is not visible on the map. If the location of this player was not in the
memory, it would have to be sent from the server to all players in the situation. If the
packet arrived to one player before the others, it would cause an unfair situation where
that player would see the other players even though they would not see him or her for a
few milliseconds. In fast-paced shooting games, a few milliseconds might be all that is
needed to win a fight. This situation is best demonstrated in Figure 8. This is why in
many shooting games the player locations are held in the memory, which makes it possible
for cheats to utilize them.
Figure 8: Player one (P1) receives the location packet before player two (P2)
In Figure 8 we can see that in the starting situation the players are on the different sides
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of the wall and, therefore, cannot see each other. When the game progresses, the player
two (P2) starts moving to the other side of the wall. Player one notices player two (P2)
because he received the packet before player two, who has not yet received it. If both
players already had the locations of other players in the memory, this situation could have
been avoided. A smart application protocol takes into account the specific circumstances
of the game that the protocol is built on. In this example case, it would be smarter to just
store the locations of the nearby players in the memory and rely more on other anti-cheat
methods. On the other hand, in a slow turn-based game, it would be perfectly suitable to
send all the necessary data at the exact moment when it is needed. Obviously, games can
implement much more complicated systems that, for example, take into account the range
of players and only send the location data of players that are sufficiently close by. This
will not work for games that operate on long distances but can be a suitable solution for a
small subset of games. A very popular commercial game engine, Unreal Engine 3, tries to
minimize the data that is sent to the client. In other words, only the exact data that is
needed for the simulation is sent to the client so the cheater cannot take advantage of the
extra data [6]. A well-implemented application protocol can be very hard to utilize for
cheating and thus is very resistant to tampering.
When designing the application protocol for a game, it is necessary to find out what kind
of information is needed in different types of situations. It is also reasonable to think in
each of these situations whether the data could be transmitted at the exact moment when
the situation occurs or if it is necessary to have it ready before.
Tamper-resistant application protocols are not hard to implement on the technical level,
but the difficulty comes from determining what type of information is needed and where.
As shown before, TCP offers a lot features out-of-the-box, so it can be a good choice for
teams that do not have a lot of experience implementing networking solutions.
A good application protocol will not generate much overhead, but often more packets can
be needed compared to a protocol that does not have any checks in place. If the game is
operating in areas with very slow internet speeds, extra attention should be paid to the
overhead.
The application protocol itself is not invasive in terms of the user data and is suitable for
all types of games, although special considerations might be needed in certain fast-paced
games. Building a tamper-resistant application protocol should be at the core of a game’s
anti-cheat approach.
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6.3 Obfuscating the network traffic
When data travels over the network, by default it is not encrypted; this means that anyone
can get the data by using tools such as Wireshark [62] or Ettercap [14] and fully understand
what is transmitted over the network. For example, in Figure 9, the game server sends
other players’ positions unencrypted to the client and a third party is capturing the packets
by using a packet sniffer tool. The packet sniffer then feeds the packet data to a custom
cheating program that constructs a world model from the data. Cheaters can then use this
world model to their advantage. For instance, the cheating program can be a “maphack”
that shows the players’ positions on a map even though normally they would not be
visible.
Figure 9: Packet sniffer uses data from packets to build a model of the game world
The situation in Figure 9 could be prevented by encrypting the packets so that the data
contained in them would not be understandable. However, even if the packets were
encrypted, the game client would need to decrypt the packets at some point to utilize the
data inside. If the cheaters managed to discover the decryption algorithm and reverse it,
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they could then decrypt the sniffed packets and cheat as before. Packet obfuscation is
not a foolproof solution and will not ultimately stop packet sniffing, but it will make it
harder and more time-consuming for the cheaters. The game developer could also choose
to change the encryption algorithm every update, forcing the cheaters to find the new
algorithm and update their decryptors. After some time, the decryption process would
become a routine step for the cheaters, but it would possibly get rid of many inexperienced
cheaters.
The encryption can be demonstrated with a real-world example by using the number
guessing game. We compare how the encrypted packets of the guessing game look compared
to the normal non-encrypted versions of these packets. We also show how much overhead
the encryption and decryption would generate both in the server and the client. The code
that encrypts the packet is shown in Listing 2. As we can see, the encryption is unique
for each player because their random token is used to encrypt the packet, so even if the
cheaters managed to discover how the encrypted algorithm works, they would still need to
have the unique key for each player which would make the cheating process longer and
harder, although not impossible.
The code shown in Listing 2 takes in an unencrypted packet, removes the opcode, and
encrypts the remaining data in the packet. The opcode cannot be encrypted because
the server has to identify packets before taking any action. The first few packets are
not encrypted so the server decides based on the opcode whether to decrypt the data or
not. The encryption itself is done using bitwise operation XOR on all the bytes with the
encryption key. The algorithm takes the i:th byte of the data and XORs it with the i:th
byte of the key. If the key is shorter than the data, then the key is treated as a circular
and the index is the division remainder of the i divided with the key length. The overhead
of the encryption scheme (Listing 2) was measured to be around 0,004 milliseconds on the
test computer that was introduced in Chapter 2. On a thousand packets, the combined
overhead would be four milliseconds. Obviously, on a more complicated encryption method,
the overhead would be higher but most likely not high enough to have a substantial effect
on the performance.
Figure 10 shows the unencrypted join matchmaking packet and Figure 11 shows the
encrypted version of the same packet. We can clearly notice that the player name “Player”
is in plain text at the end of the unencrypted packet while the content of the encrypted
one looks unclear and it is hard to tell what the packet is transmitting. Being able to read
the player name from the packet is not very dangerous, but in many games, the packets
contain things such as player locations that are not supposed to be displayed to the client.
An encryption with unique keys for each player is also a strong tool against MitM (Man
in the middle) attacks [50].
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1 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
2 // I f encrypt ion i s not in use , j u s t re turn the packet as normal
3 i f ( ! th i s−>mUseEncryption ) {
4 re turn packet ;
5 }
6 // Extract opcode from the packet
7 s f : : Packet encryptedPacket ;
8
9 i n t opCode ;
10 packet >> opCode ;
11 encryptedPacket << opCode ;
12
13 // Get data o f the packet in to bu f f e r
14 const char ∗ charBuf f e r = ( char ∗) packet . getData ( )+s i z e o f ( char ) ∗4 ;
15 i n t n = packet . getDataSize ( )−s i z e o f ( char ) ∗4 ;
16
17 // Convert the char ∗ data bu f f e r to std : : vec to r data bu f f e r
18 std : : vector<char> data ( charBuf fer , charBuf f e r + n) ;
19 std : : s i z e_t dataS ize = n ;
20 std : : vector<char> encryptedData ;
21
22 // Encrypt by XOR: ing with encrypt ion key
23 f o r ( std : : s i z e_t i = 0 ; i < dataS ize ; i++) {
24 encryptedData . push_back ( data [ i ] ^ key [ i % key . l ength ( ) ] ) ;
25 }
26 // Create the encrypted packet and append the data
27 encryptedPacket . append ( encryptedData . data ( ) , dataS i ze ) ;
28 re turn encryptedPacket ;
29 }
Listing 2: Packet encryption in the guessing game
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Figure 10: Unencrypted version of enter matchmaking packet
Figure 11: Encrypted version of enter matchmaking packet
A well-designed packet encryption scheme is an important part of designing an anti-cheat
system. It is a good method because it has very few disadvantages when compared to the
benefits that it offers. While it is not a bulletproof system, it still adds a strong barrier to
cheating and makes spoofing the game data harder for inexperienced cheat developers. It
can be said that packet encryption tries to hide the game protocol and thus brings security
through obscurity.
The simple XOR-based encryption scheme demonstrated here should never be used in
real games due to its various weaknesses. In real games, developers should consider using
already established networking libraries that provide well-tested networking functionalities
such as secure connections. They also provide things like different lanes for packets that
have to arrive and for packets that are not very critical. For example, popular networking
library RakNet [40] provides data security on par with 256-bit TLS. It offers an efficient 256-
bit Elliptic Curve key agreement with forward secrecy that protects each connection with
the server. RakNet encrypts each message and stamps them with a message authentication
code and a unique identifier that protects sensitive data and prevents replay attacks.
Setting up the encryption in RakNet only takes a few steps, which involve generating a
public and private key and setting the private key to the server and putting the public key
inside the game client [40].
Using a popular and well-tested library such as RakNet is much preferable to making
a custom solution; making a well-made custom encryption scheme takes considerable
time that could otherwise be spent on other anti-cheat measures. Furthermore, testing a
custom solution with a large number of players before launching the game might prove
difficult.
Based on the results in this chapter, encrypting the game network traffic should be part of
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any game’s anti-cheat toolkit as the overhead is very minimal and there are well-tested
networking libraries available that take care of the heavy lifting. Network traffic encryption
is one of the prime methods of anti-cheat, but it is still limited by the fact that the client
has full control of the computer and can work through how the encryption works on the
client-side. As noted in this chapter, this can be alleviated by changing the encryption
method every time the game receives an update.
Finally, we evaluate this method in the context of the five key attributes: resistance to
tampering, ease of implementation, lack of overhead, non-invasiveness, and suitability for
a wide variety of games.
In terms of resistance to tampering, the packet encryption makes it harder for cheaters to
determine the contents of the game packets. It can also effectively make more inexperienced
cheaters abandon their attempts to cheat because figuring out the encryption scheme is
much more difficult than just capturing the packets and viewing the data. Note that both
client and server need keys for both decryption and encryption. However, the player should
not have access, or at least not an easy way to access, these keys. Public key cryptography
would not really help in this because only one of the keys (encryption key) can be made
public, the other one (decryption key) still needs to be kept secret. Even if the encryption
was completely secure, the data could still be retrieved before the encryption.
When it comes to ease of implementation, the encryption scheme is usually quite easy to
implement because of the many premade libraries available that take care of the heavy
lifting. Even if the game developers decide to implement the whole system from scratch, it
still needs to be deployed only on one central place in the code that handles all the packet
encryption/decryption, and thus the other game code can remain unchanged. Overall,
network traffic encryption is one of the easiest methods to implement.
In terms of overhead, decryption and encryption should not be a major issue because
the algorithm is fast and processing power is very high on modern computers. However,
utilizing encrypted network traffic will still be slightly slower than using non-encrypted
traffic because of the extra overhead.
The packet encryption is by definition non-invasive in terms of user privacy because it
does not access private user data. Passing the data through the encryption algorithm does
not make it any more vulnerable in terms of privacy.
This method is suitable for all types of games and does not have fundamental limitations
that would make it unfit for certain games.
Overall, packet obfuscation is a powerful anti-cheat technique given its small overhead,
ease of implementation, and the fact that it can make it much more difficult to understand
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game data from the captured packets. It is also the only anti-cheat method that works
directly on the packet-level and thus it is hard to replace with other techniques.
6.4 Utilizing statistical methods to discover cheaters
It is possible for the server to collect various types of player data such as number of wins,
kills, deaths, or whatever interesting data the game has. For example, in a first-person
shooter, the game server might track the number of kills the player gets every match and
compare it to the game averages and the player’s past record. If the kill count diverges
enough from the global average or the player’s own past record, the system could flag
the player for further investigation by a human reviewer. The problem with these kinds
of systems is that it is often very hard to make a direct judgement based on statistical
data. For instance, there are players that practise many hours every day and are much
better than most players, so their score diverges a lot from the average. If the system
automatically banned people who are much better, it could generate many false positives
and hurt the reputation of the game. This is why many statistics-based systems are often
linked with a human-operated review system. Statistics-based systems are also well suited
to catch exploiting of bugs such as selling an item to a shop for a higher price than it was
bought for as mentioned in the Chapter 5 Section 1.
FairFight is an example of an anti-cheat system that purely uses these types of server-side
statistical methods without any client-side anti-cheat. It is very effective and is used in
many high-profile games such as Battlefield V, Tom Clancy’s The Division, and Titanfall
2. The company behind the development of Fairfight, GameBlocks, explains that the
players’ actions are tested against multiple statistical markers to determine if cheating
occurs. The anti-cheat also allows the game developers to customize the rule sets and
data that the anti-cheat uses to determine whether a player is cheating or not [17]. What
makes Fairfight so powerful is that the developers do not need to spend time implementing
the anti-cheat itself; rather, they can just integrate the premade system in the game and
customize the rules and determine what data will be used.
The popular online competitive shooting game Counter-Strike: Global Offensive utilizes a
system called Overwatch [35]. The system is based around other players reviewing footage
from players that are suspected of cheating. Many reviewers are looking at the same
cases and the majority decides whether the suspect was cheating or not. The reviewers
are selected based on their game participation such as competitive wins, skill group,
account age, and hours played. If they have served as an investigator before, their previous
accuracy rate also affects whether they can keep reviewing cases. For example, if they have
continuously made wrong judgements, then they might not be able to review cases in the
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future. Wrong judgements are decisions that go against the majority of the other players
who are reviewing the same case. The investigator can view the game from the viewpoint
of the suspected cheater and also fly around the map in free mode and look at the match
from different perspectives. Overwatch also allows the reviewers to see through walls to
determine if the cheater actually saw the other players through walls and if the actions
give it away. The game company obviously does not share the algorithm that selects the
suspected cheaters, but they state that it is based on the behavioral patterns and whether
a certain player stands out from other players in terms of being reported for cheating or
otherwise being flagged by the server. Figure 12 shows how the person who reviewed the
evidence can choose to vote if the inspected player was cheating or not.
Figure 12: Passing judgement after reviewing evidence in Counter Strike: Global Offensive’s
Overwatch system
The reviewers have access to a replay of randomly selected eight-round segment from the
suspected cheater’s match. Things like chat and voice are disabled and other players’
names are blurred so the determination has to be solely based on the actions of the player.
After reviewing all the footage, if the investigators collectively determine by a large margin
that the player cheated, then the cheater is banned by the system. The length of the
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ban is determined by the severity of the offense that the cheaters committed and also
whether they have any prior cheating history. It should be noted that a judgement of
a higher-ranked investigator will have more weight in the system. For instance, if one
investigator has a success rate of ninety percent and the other has a success rate of fifty
percent, the judgement of the former investigator will weigh more in the conclusion. The
system rewards players who participate and review cases.
A review system like Overwatch is a very powerful tool for curbing cheating because it
is purely server-side and it combines the statistical analysis approach with experienced
human reviewers. However, this type of system requires a large and active playerbase,
which all games do not have. It also requires the game to be competitive (i.e., where
players compete against each other), but many games focus primarily on cooperation where
players fight together against AI opponents. These types of games do not give players a big
incentive to report other players because everyone is on the same team against computer
opponents. Even though all players are on the same team, cheating can negatively affect
the game systems such as the in-game economy.
The problem in using statistical methods is primarily the need for human resources to
analyze the flagged players. These human reviewers can be players as in the Overwatch
system, or they can be people that are directly hired by the game company to evaluate
these cases. Many smaller companies might find it difficult to utilize these types of systems
because of financial constraints or low number of players. This leaves them to either very
slowly go through the marked players with limited manpower or take risks and immediately
ban players who significantly diverge from the average. Neither of these situations are
ideal, so every company has to plan a model that works for their specific situation. There
are also external companies that offer these types of data-based anti-cheat systems as a
service to game companies. One of these anti-cheat systems is Easy Anti-Cheat[12], which
was recently acquired by Epic Games [20].
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Figure 13: Hypothetical flow of the guessing game’s statistics-based anti-cheat
The number guessing game that was implemented for this thesis does not have any statistics-
based anti-cheat system. Figure 13 introduces a flow that represents a hypothetical system
that would be suitable for this type of game. Since the rounds in the number guessing game
are very simple, each round can be recorded in a database by writing down the sequence
of moves that happened in the round. The system would flag players who statistically
win more games than the average of other players. The recordings would be stored in
the database for few months so a human reviewer could review the games if needed. The
system would also outright ban players who keep winning many games in a row on only
very few guesses because that would be statistically extremely unlikely unless they were
cheating.
As more and more games collect huge amounts of data, the use of statistical methods
has become very common. It has even spawned companies whose main product is an
anti-cheat system that heavily utilizes game data. Examples of these companies are the
aforementioned Easy Anti-Cheat [12] and FairFight [17]. Unlike most other methods, it is
harder to bypass an anti-cheat that is based on statistical methods because modifying the
client code will not help to avoid the anti-cheat as long as the data is correctly handled on
the server and the data from the client is not trusted directly. The weaknesses of this type
of system are usually the need for large amounts of data and the need for some form of
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human oversight, which can be challenging for smaller companies.
When evaluating statistical anti-cheat methods in terms of resistance to tampering, we
can conclude that they are very resistant because they are employed on the server side
and purely rely on the data that comes from different clients in large numbers. Of course,
there is always a possibility that the data is not verified adequately and tampered data
slips through. Other techniques such as a tamper-resistant application protocol can help
mitigate bad data. A weakness of these types of methods is that the cheater can manage
to cheat just enough to not to cross the detection threshold of the anti-cheat. For instance,
the cheater can purposefully not use the cheats to the full extent and make it look like
normal improvement in player skill level.
Statistical anti-cheat methods are usually difficult to implement because of the need for
large amounts of data to be used in the analysis. The developers also need to consider
how this data can be used to evaluate the possibility of cheating. The company might
need to hire data scientists to tackle the development of this type of anti-cheat because a
game developer might not have the needed skills for the data-related work.
The overhead of statistical methods is non-existent because they are usually run in parallel
and most likely on different machines. The data analysis does not interfere with the game
pipeline at all. However, more data will usually require more computation resources, which
means that the game company has to spend more money.
Statistical methods are generally non-invasive if they only collect game-related data and
not other types of data from the users’ computers. However, the developers need to be
careful how to manage possibly sensitive data and make it clear to the user how their data
is being handled.
Statistical methods are not well-suited for all types of games, as they require large amounts
of data. For instance, a game might have a low playerbase and thus does not have the
needed amount of data for statistical analysis. The data also has to be in a format that
lends itself well to use in statistical methods. This can require big changes to the game,
especially if the anti-cheat is being implemented later.
Overall, statistical anti-cheat methods are among the best tools to fight cheating, especially
considering their high tampering resistance, low overhead, and non-invasiveness. All these
are reasons why commercial data-based anti-cheat systems like FairFight and Easy Anti-
Cheat are increasingly popular and preferred over the old systems that mostly rely on
client-side techniques.
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7 Client-side anti-cheat methods
Client-side anti-cheat methods are solutions that are run on the player’s local machine.
Examples of these are the Valve Anti-Cheat (VAC) and PunkBuster, both of which were
introduced in Chapter 3. The weakness of client-side anti-cheat approaches is the fact that
they are run on the local machine that the cheater has full access to. This chapter will
analyze five different client-side anti-cheat methods: code encryption, verifying files by
hashing, detecting known cheat programs, obfuscating memory, and kernel-based anti-cheat
drivers. Some types of cheats such as wallhacks are very hard to detect using server-side
techniques, which is why client-side methods are still relevant today.
In the context of client-side anti-cheat, it is important to remember that mobile devices
and gaming consoles are also computers. Many console and mobile game developers have
not given much thought to anti-cheat and instead have relied on the assumed hard-to-hack
nature of the devices. For instance, Elder Scrolls Blades mobile game lacked an anti-cheat
and cheaters released many cheat programs for it [22]. In the context of PlayStation
consoles, the console needs to be “Jailbroken”, which means that the user gets to run
uncertified software and do things that are not permitted on a standard console. This
enables the user, among other things, to run cheat programs [33]. Jailbreaking a console
is not easy, as it requires taking multiple non-trivial steps. For instance, the first PS4
Jailbreaks exploited a Webkit vulnerability where the payload software was uploaded to
a website and the user changed the DNS settings of the PS4 to point to a custom DNS
server. After the user went to a certain menu in the PS4 settings, the custom DNS server
returned the address of the site that served the exploit to the PS4.
Another important thing to note is that writing robust code is an essential part of preventing
vulnerabilities in the game. If the game contains faulty code that enables the user to inject
their own code into the game, it makes the game very vulnerable to cheating. For example,
if a string is read from user input and put into a buffer of predefined size and the user
supplies a string that is larger than the buffer, the remaining part of the string overflows
to some other area in the memory. In computer security, this type of attack is known as
buffer overflow attack [11]. The cheater can then determine a string of a certain size and
make it overflow to the code region of the game and overwrite game code with cheat code
and have it executed. While auditing code for vulnerabilities is not an anti-cheat method
itself, it is a notable part of making the game client secure.
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7.1 Code encryption
Code encryption means the process of encrypting the code section of the game (Figure
14). This can mean full encryption that is removed when the application is launched or
partial decryption where parts of the game executable are decrypted once they are needed
and then re-encrypted. This chapter will look into different code encryption techniques
and analyze their various strengths and weaknesses. It should be noted that the game
client has to be able to both encrypt and decrypt the code so the keys need to be stored
somewhere in the game memory. This is in contrast to public-key cryptography, where
public keys can be distributed to everyone but only the owner has the private key that
can be used to decrypt information.
Figure 14: Typical memory layout of an application with the code (TEXT) section highlighted
Code packing is the simplest form of code encryption. Most of the code in the executable
becomes unreadable for the static analysis and the code is restored at the runtime by
an unpacking routine. The use of code packing is very popular in malware development
because malware developers want to make their malicious software harder to detect and
analyze. One of the most popular packing programs is called UPX [53]. Figure 15
illustrates how the entry point code of the non-packed game executable looks in the reverse
engineering tool Ghidra [19]. Both in Figure 15a and Figure 15b, the disassembled and
decompiled code is clear. Figure 16 respectively illustrates how the entry point code looks
when it is packed. We can note that the packed code in Figure 16 is much harder to
make sense of when compared to the unpacked code in Figure 15. For instance, in the
non-packed executable in Figure 15, Ghidra can automatically detect and make much sense
of the main function while in the packed executable the code does not give much away and
Ghidra cannot provide much info about it either. In Figure 17, Ghidra cannot even view
the code because it is packed and thus not recognizable to the analyzer. Code packing can
be a cost-effective way to give some protection to the game, but if the cheater discovers
which packer has been used, the same packer can usually be used to unpack the executable.
For example, with UPX the cheater could just run upx -d <executable-name> and the
unpacked game would be vulnerable to analysis.
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(a) ASM code of the non-packed game executable’s entry point
(b) Decompiled C code of the non-packed game executable’s
entry point
Figure 15: Codes of the non-packed and UPX packed game executable’s entry point viewed in
Ghidra
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(a) ASM code of the non-packed game executable’s entry point
(b) Decompiled C code of the non-packed game executable’s entry point
Figure 16: ASM code (above) and decompiled C code (below) of the UPX packed game
executable’s entry point viewed in Ghidra
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Figure 17: UPX packed code viewed in Ghidra
Cappaert et al. introduce an on-demand decryption framework that will decrypt and
encrypt an entire function at once [4]. This is in contrast to typical packing tools that
pack an executable to defend against static analysis but use a small unencrypted bootstrap
section to decrypt the entire program at the start of the application, thereby making it
vulnerable to dynamic code analysis. The problem with this kind of full decryption is that
once the application is fully decrypted, one can dump the entire process image to disk
and analyze it later. According to [4], the main advantage of encryption is that it hides
the internals of the program and protects against static analysis. It is also hard for the
attacker to statically change bits because the changed bits will result in bit flips in the
decrypted version of the code, which in turn results in modified instructions that may lead
to a crash or unintended behavior [4].
Figure 18 shows the process of bulk decryption where the entire program is decrypted at
once by the small portion that is not encrypted. Figure 19 shows the partial decryption
technique. As we can see in Figure 18, the code is instantly vulnerable after the decryption.
Extracting the game executable will require the cheater to observe the code in the
unencrypted bootstrap section and implement the algorithm there to fully decrypt the
executable. If the game uses partial encryption and decryption, the cheater has to observe
the different functions when they are in their decrypted state and build a clear picture of
what is happening in the game code. The encryption code could also be changed on each
game update to make life harder for the cheaters.
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Figure 18: Bulk decryption of the game executable
Figure 19: On-demand decryption of the game executable
We will go through the process presented in Figure 19. Step (1) represents the entry point
of the program, which is unencrypted because otherwise the operating system would not
be able to run the program. In step (2), some unencrypted part of the code wants to call
another function that is encrypted. First it needs to call the function guard (3) to decrypt
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the function. In this model, the decryption works so that the guard computes a hash of the
immediate dominator of the callee and then the callee is decrypted with the hash acting as
a key. In step (4), the guard returns and the function caller can call the decrypted function
(5). Finally, in step (6) the function caller calls the guard to re-encrypt the function with
the same method of calculating a checksum of the immediate dominator of the callee, and
the callee is encrypted with the checksum being the key [4]. In short, there are three steps
when running a method inside the partially decrypted program: calling function guard to
decrypt the method, running the method, and calling function guard again to re-encrypt
the method.
Compared to decrypting the whole executable in bulk, the overhead is obviously greater
because the decryption and encryption have to be run constantly and not just once at the
beginning of the program. Cappert et al. looked at the overhead generated by the full
decryption method and the on-demand method. The tests were conducted using Diablo
[9] link-time binary rewriter to patch the binary code of different programs, including
inserting the extra encryption functionality inside the executables. The results for the
bulk decryption method were clear: the overhead was less than 1%. However, Table 1
shows that the execution time of the on-demand decryption method was relatively high
on some programs such as milc and sphinx_livepretend [4]. Note that the Table 1 shows
the execution time relative to the unedited version of the same program. For example,
sphinx_livepretend took 6.65 times longer when compared to version that does not use the
on-demand encryption.
Program name Total functions Encrypted functions Execution time
mcf 22 20 1.09
milc 159 146 8.17
hmmer 234 184 3.20
lbm 19 12 1.00
sphinx_livepretend 210 192 6.65
Table 1: Execution time of programs using the standard on-demand decryption model
Table 1 reveals that milc encrypted with the on-demand scheme suffers a high performance
cost with execution taking more than eight times the time of the non-encrypted base
program. It can be observed that the size of the overhead is dependent on the nature
of the program, such as how many function calls there are, how large the functions are,
and how rapidly they are called over a period of time. Table 1, milc details a program
used by the MIMD Lattice Computation (MILC) to run large scale numerical simulation
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and study quantum chromodynamics, which is the theory of the strong interactions of
subatomic physics. The program is very heavy numerically and has many methods that
deal with matrix calculations. These methods are run multiple times, which requires
constant decrypting and encrypting [30]. If we extrapolate the results in Table 1 to games,
they do not bode well because many games use 3D rendering, for example. The graphics
engine executes the same rendering functions constantly, and if they are continuously
decrypted and encrypted, it can unnecessarily impact performance and make for a poor
game experience.
When building an anti-cheat system, we are not generally interested in protecting functions
related to rendering, audio, or other functions unrelated to important game mechanics that
can be exploited. Cappert et al. propose an improved system that utilizes the dynamic
profile information that is generated by Diablo [4]. Based on this information, the so-called
hot functions are excluded from the on-demand encryption and are instead protected with
bulk encryption. A given function is considered hot if the amount of times it is called








In the threshold calculation formula, the functions are indexed from 1 onwards and are
arranged in a decreasing order by the number of times that they are called. Additionally,
the formula implies that the threshold represents the smallest number of function calls
needed to be classified as a hot function. K represents the ratio of function calls and is a
number between zero and one. K is always chosen first and only then the threshold can
be calculated. If K was 0, it would mean that all functions were hot, and adversely, if K
was 1, it would mean that none of the functions would be hot. N represents the number of
functions.
Program name Total functions Encrypted functions Execution time
mcf 22 20 1.04
milc 159 146 1.95
hmmer 234 184 1.15
lbm 19 12 1.00
sphinx_livepretend 210 192 1.72
Table 2: Execution time of programs using the improved on-demand decryption model
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When using the improved scheme on the same programs as before, Table 2 shows that the
execution times were vastly improved. For instance, the milc now has almost four times
faster execution time when compared to the scheme without the hot function classification
(Figure 1). However, the problem with the hot function classification in anti-cheat systems
is that it is purely based on the number of function calls and is done dynamically without
any input from the game developer. There could be situations in certain games where we
want to on-demand encrypt and decrypt functions that exceed the threshold value but are
too important to be left for bulk encryption. With the scheme proposed by Cappert et al.,
this is not possible to implement.
Based on the principle of on-demand encryption, we now introduce an improved scheme.
This model takes into account the unique needs of anti-cheat systems where we want to
select functions that we want to protect. In this scheme, the threshold value would be
used the same way as the model presented by Cappert et al., but the developer could
manually mark certain methods to be exempt from the threshold value check and encrypted
on-demand whether or not they exceed the threshold value [4]. This scheme would also
relieve the programmer from the extra work of going through all the methods and leave
the focus on the methods that the programmer knows will be run many times and need
to be protected regardless. Games also often use external libraries and components such
as graphics engines and audio tools that game developers do not even touch on the code
level. The improved scheme encrypts methods based on the threshold value just like in
the [4] on-demand encryption method but it also allows the developer to exempt methods
from encryption.
In practice, the improved scheme would work by informing the encrypting software of
the function addresses that are exempt. Cappert et al. utilized Diablo link-time binary
rewriter to patch the binary code of the program and insert the encryption and decryption
functionality. In our case, Diablo or a similar program can be provided with the exempt
function addresses and everything else can be done exactly as in the improved on-demand
scheme with the hot functions threshold. Figure 20 represents one way to implement the
final anti-cheat optimized scheme.
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Figure 20: Anti-cheat optimized on-demand encryption scheme
The process in the Figure 20 can be summed as follows:
1. The game code is compiled and then linked to make the unencrypted binary
file.
2. During the compilation process the symbol table is formed with the names
of all functions and their addresses along with other data such as section
addresses.
3. Link-time binary rewriter reads the names of the exempt functions from a
file that the developer has created.
4. Link-time binary rewriter reads the symbol table and matches the names of
the exempt functions from the step 3 with their addresses.
5. Link-time binary rewriter takes in the original game binary.
6. Link-time binary rewriter modifies the game binary according to the on-
demand encryption scheme and writes in the encryption code while taking
into account the methods that were exempt by the developer and will always
be encrypted.
The baseline speed of the final scheme with zero exemptions is the same as in the threshold
version of the on-demand encryption system presented in [4]. The more frequent and
complex the exempt functions, the more the performance will suffer. It is impossible to
calculate a standard performance overhead that exempted functions generate because they
can vary widely. The threshold formula also does not take into account the size of the
functions, so it is left to the developer to decide which functions must be protected in
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order to thwart cheaters. Evaluating the gained benefit against the implied overhead costs
becomes a part of the anti-cheat development process.
Within the group of client-side anti-cheat methods, code encryption stands out as the
single core method because it also protects the other anti-cheat approaches such as file
verification, cheat program detection, and everything else that has to do with the game
memory. For example, if the game’s anti-cheat system contains a module that scans the
computer for known cheat programs, the code of this module would also be encrypted,
which would make it many times harder to crack. In short, the code encryption protects all
the other client-side anti-cheat mechanisms from tampering and makes the whole system
much more robust.
A well-designed encryption system does not require much work from the developers after
building the initial system, so encrypting the game code becomes part of the standard
build process. Once the game executable is built, it is run through the encryptor and that
is all that needs to be done. With an on-demand encryption scheme that allows developers
to exempt methods from encryption, there is almost no reason not to include it in a game’s
anti-cheat solution.
When looking at code encryption from the viewpoint of tampering resistance, it is clear
that code can be decrypted by a skilled cheater. The difficulty of decrypting depends on
the code encryption scheme. A partial encryption scheme will be harder to crack than an
encryption scheme that decrypts the whole program at the start. When deployed alone,
the code encryption does not fare well in terms of tampering resistance. This is similar to
what is the case with the other client-side anti-cheat methods.
When it comes to the ease of implementing the code encryption, it is much trickier than
many other anti-cheat methods considered in this chapter. Developing a good partial
encryption scheme requires major time investments from the developers at the outset.
It also requires changes and maintenance when the game is released because the code
encryption might be breached by the cheaters. The developers also need to determine
which parts of the game to encrypt and which not to. However, the developers could
choose to use an existing packer like UPX which would be trivial, but at the same time, it
would be much easier for cheaters to circumvent as shown in the start of this section.
Code encryption always introduces some overhead, and as demonstrated earlier, the size of
the overhead depends on the amount of encrypted code and the frequency that this code is
encrypted and decrypted. Thus the overhead is very dependent on the specific game.
In terms of invasiveness, the code encryption only works within the game’s own memory
space and has no effect on other programs. The method is suitable for all types of games
as it works on a very low-level and is unaffected by what is built on top of it. Obviously,
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certain games can be faster-paced and thus generate more overhead.
Overall, the code encryption is a non-invasive anti-cheat method that introduces some
amount of overhead depending on how often the code encryption is utilized and how large
portions of code are encrypted. Well-implemented partial code encryption provides good
tampering resistance, but as with all other client-side methods, it is still vulnerable to
skilled cheaters. The main strength of the technique is its ability to protect other anti-cheat
methods and make the whole solution tougher to crack.
7.2 Verifying files by hashing
Verifying files by hashing is a method to ensure that the game files have not been modified.
In many games, modifying files such as textures on walls can give the player an unfair
advantage. For example, the cheater could modify the wall textures to be transparent
so all enemies could be seen through walls. The cheater could also adjust the lightning
to make it easier to see enemies. Obviously these types of modifications could not be
easily caught by any server-side anti-cheat method because they are purely done on the
client-side.
In order to combat the changing of important game files, developers can utilize a technique
known as hashing where the content of the file is read and a (in practice unique) hash code
is generated based on the content. The hash code matches the content of the file exactly,
so even if one byte is changed, the hash code will be different. The hash code can also be
generated from only the file metadata, such as the date modified and the file size, but this
kind of hash generation is much easier to circumvent. Obviously, the cheater can try to
modify the hash generator method and generate fake hashes that make it look like the file
is unchanged. Preventing method modification requires other anti-cheat methods that are
presented in this thesis. This section introduces an example file verification system built
on top of the guessing game that was shown in Chapter 2.
Because the example game is very simple and does not contain resource files that many
larger games have, we will demonstrate the hashing system by creating a small example
resource file and coding the game to take its hash and send it to the server. The server
tries to verify the integrity of this file, and if it succeeds, the game is allowed to proceed.
In the event that the verification fails, the user is immediately disconnected from the game.
Figure 21 represents the file verification system used in our example game. In a more
complex real-world game, the server would have a database of hashes of the important
game files such as maps and textures.
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Figure 21: Simple file verification scheme in the example game
Our system presented in Figure 21 works as follows:
1. The game calculates a hash of its resource file.
2. The game sends the hash to the game server.
3. The game server validates the hash by comparing it to the one in its
database.
4. Action is taken depending on the result of the validation.
a If the hash does not match, the user is disconnected from the server.
b If the hash matches, the game is allowed to continue.
On Listing 3, we can see the code that does the integration check on the client-side.
The hash is calculated from the file and sent to the server in a packet using the opcode
USER_SEND_FILE_HASH. In the server-side, the server receives the packet and inspects
the hash code by comparing it to the hash that is stored on the server-side. Note that
the implementation of std::hash is platform-dependant so the result might be different on
different operating systems [44]. A real game should use its own hashing mechanism that
is consistent across platforms.
There are examples of real games that did not have any kind of hash verification of their
resources, such as map files. For instance, in early versions of World of Warcraft it was
actually possible to edit the map files to be able to go to areas in the game that were
normally off-limits. Lack of any file verification allowed the cheater to build bridges in the
sky and walk on them. To other players with the correct map files, it would appear as if
the cheater was walking in the air because the server was just translating the packets from
the client without any verification that the map files were untouched. Obviously nowadays
this not possible in most games, at least not easily.
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1 void InputNameScene : : Ver i fyGameIntegr i ty ( ) {
2 t ry {
3 // Support Windows and OS X
4 std : : i f s t r e am in ( getPathForResource ( ) , s td : : i o s : : in | s td : : i o s : :
b inary ) ;
5
6 std : : i f s t r e am : : pos_type pos = in . t e l l g ( ) ;
7 std : : vector<char> bu f f e r ( pos ) ;
8 in . seekg (0 , std : : i o s : : beg ) ;
9 in . read(&bu f f e r [ 0 ] , pos ) ;
10
11 std : : hash<char∗> hash ;
12 s i z e_t resu l tHash = hash ( bu f f e r . data ( ) ) ;
13 std : : cout << resu l tHash ;
14
15 s f : : Packet gameIntegr i tyPacket = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (
OpCodes : :USER_SEND_FILE_HASH) ;
16 std : : s t r i n g hashAsStr ing = std : : to_st r ing ( resu l tHash ) ;
17 gameIntegr i tyPacket << hashAsStr ing ;
18 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( gameIntegr ityPacket , th i s−>
mPacketHandler−>GetSendAddress ( ) ) ;
19
20 } catch ( std : : except ion &e ) {
21 std : : cout << " Fa i l ed to v e r i f y game i n t e g r i t y , abor t ing " ;
22 }
23 }
Listing 3: Code demonstrating the hash calculation in the guessing game client-side
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Figure 22: GenerateFakeHash cheat method hooked to the GenerateHash method
In terms of tampering resistance, a hash-based file verification system is very easy to exploit
when deployed alone. As explained, the cheater could edit the client-side hash calculation
methods so that they always return the correct hash even if the file was modified (Figure
3 Step 1). This is futher demonstrated in Figure 22. In Figure 22, (1) the game normally
calls the GenerateHash method, but at the end of the method, the cheater has patched
the game so that the GenerateHash method actually calls the fake GenerateFakeHash
method (2). The GenerateFakeHash method outputs a fake hash that makes it look like
nothing has changed. Instead of the legitimate hash, the fake hash is returned to the caller
function (3). This type of cheating is called hooking and it is more closely explored in
Chapter 5, Section 5. The hook can be either placed at the start or at the end of the
function, like in this example. If the hook is placed at the beginning, the hook usually
modifies the data that is passed to the function. If the hook is placed at end, the function
result is usually modified and returned to the caller. On it own, the hash calculation
method is very vulnerable to being hijacked, as demonstrated in Figure 22.
The cheater could also directly edit the packet data to send the correct hash regardless
of what is really calculated (Figure 3, Step 2). The method itself is easy to implement
as it only requires a function that calculates the hashes and sends them to the server for
verification. Any developer should be able to quickly implement this system.
The file hashing method barely generates any overhead as the hash calculation is usually
very quick to perform and it only needs to be performed when the file (or part of the file)
is loaded into the memory. If the file is loaded again, the hash verification will obviously
need to be performed again.
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The hashing method is generally not invasive as it only calculates hashes of the game files
which should not contain anything related to the users’ privacy. The method also has no
limitations when it comes to different types of games.
Overall, while hash-based file verification is easy to implement and has almost non-existent
overhead, all these benefits mostly go to waste because it is so easy to circumvent. It is
hard to argue that hash-based file verification should be used as a standalone anti-cheat
method, but when combined with code encryption, it is harder to tamper with and works
well in deterring cheaters from editing the game files. Out of all client-side anti-cheat
methods, hash verification is the weakest when it is deployed alone.
7.3 Detecting known cheat programs
A proper anti-cheat program should have a way to scan the user’s computer for known
cheating programs based on various signatures. The simplest method can simply entail
comparing hashes or process names, but these methods are easily circumvented and thus
not recommended. In this chapter, we look at different ways of detecting known cheat
software on the client computer. The importance of maintaining some form of cheat
database is highlighted by the fact that many cheats get sold or otherwise distributed by
their developers and quickly become popular among cheaters in the game community. The
spread of commercial cheating tools benefits criminals and destroys the game experience
of normal players.
Figure 23: Example of identifier-based anti-cheat system
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Figure 23 represents an example of an identifier-based anti-cheat system that has a
database of different types of identifiers that can be used to detect known cheating
programs. Identifier databases make it possible to use various kinds of markers such as
window titles, hashes of executable files, and process names. This makes it harder for the
cheater to pinpoint what exact information is being utilized on the server side.
At the implementation level, this anti-cheat method would more or less rely on the API
functions of the operating systems to retrieve the list of process names and window titles.
For instance, on Windows the method EnumProcesses would be used [13]. Without any
other anti-cheat methods to support it, the identifier-based anti-cheat is very easy to
hijack and make the program send fabricated data to the server. The same problem
was highlighted in the hash-based file verification anti-cheat in Chapter 6, Section 2.
Figure 24 demonstrates the main issue with using this anti-cheat method as a standalone
solution.
Figure 24: Main problem points with identifier-based anti-cheat
The first weakness in the system, shown in Figure 24, is the scanning that the client
performs on the local machine. The cheater can easily manipulate the scanning methods
and feed them false data which then gets sent to the server. The cheater can also use
other means to evade detection. For example, cheat developers can randomly generate
window titles and also randomly change the executable itself, which would break the
hashing because the anti-cheat developers would not be able to update the database fast
enough. The second weakness is at the point where the client sends the data to the server.
Without the help of other anti-cheat methods, the packet can easily be modified on the fly
and false data passed to the server. The other way is that the cheater directly hijacks the
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methods that send packets to the server and modifies these methods to send false data.
As we can see, there are many ways to exploit identifier-based anti-cheat.
Even with a more complex scheme of getting program identifiers, the method would be
vulnerable to all of the same exploits. Without the help of other anti-cheat methods,
the detection of known cheat programs by the use of identifiers is not an effective way
of blocking cheating. When combined with other methods such as code encryption and
memory obfuscation, it can be an important addition to the game’s anti-cheat toolkit. It
provides a way to combat the mass adoption of different anti-cheat programs, allowing
anti-cheat developers to catch other people who are utilizing the exact same tools that
were discovered earlier by the anti-cheat.
Some cheat tools update themselves automatically and thus they connect to certain
addresses. Anti-cheat programs can use this to their advantage and inspect the DNS
history for update addresses of known cheats. If the cheating tool is smartly done, it can
clear the DNS history, but some cheat developers have overlooked this which has led to
detecting many cheaters. In Chapter 3 we discussed Valve Anti-Cheat, which used to
access the DNS cache in order to catch kernel-level cheats that contacted their DRM server
in order to verify that the user had actually bought the cheat. This allowed the game
company Valve to catch and ban many cheaters, which demonstrates that looking though
the DNS history can be a powerful addition to other identifiers.
One important factor in the usefulness of this anti-cheat method is that the developer
acquires a large amount of cheat signatures. These signatures can be added to the
database once a cheat is identified. For instance, the developers of the popular online
game PlayerUnknown’s Battleground (PUBG) reported that they have around 100 people
dedicated to monitoring sites where online cheats are being sold [2]. In this way, the
company can quickly acquire the identifiers of the popular cheats and block them. The
identifiers can be also acquired automatically by other anti-cheat methods. For example,
if the kernel-based anti-cheat driver detects a cheating attempt, it can save the identifiers
of the cheat executable and send them to the server.
In terms of the evaluation criteria introduced in Chapter 2, the method fares badly when
it comes to resistance to tampering. As pointed out in this section, there are many ways
for the cheater to hijack and modify the data that is sent to the server. For example, the
cheater can reverse engineer the game and edit the methods to take in false data.
When it comes to the ease of implementation, it really depends on how complex the
identification system will be. A simple system is cheap and fast to implement, but a
system that uses more complex identifiers (such as parts of the program code) can become
very complicated.
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Overhead generated by the system will be minimal because it simultaneously collects and
sends data to the server and does not interfere with the game logic itself.
An identifier-based anti-cheat method is very intrusive when it comes to the users’ privacy,
however. Things such as window titles and program names can reveal sensitive data like
credit card numbers and other private information.
The method works the same regardless of what type of game it is used on, as it works
outside the game logic itself and performs its function simultaneously.
Finally, we can see that the method suffers from the same issues as other client-side
methods but on a larger scale because its code is not encrypted and its memory is not
obfuscated. If deployed alone, the identifier-based anti-cheat will be easy to circumvent
for a skilled cheater.
7.4 Obfuscating memory
All programs have a part called the heap (Figure 25) that contains dynamically allocated
variables. Even small programs can have hundreds of thousands of variables in the
heap.
Figure 25: Typical application memory layout with heap highlighted
Among the variables in the heap, there may be important data such as player coordinates
that are not meant to be seen by the player but only to be processed by the game itself.
This vulnerability can be easily exploited by cheaters. For instance, a cheater might be
able to narrow down the location of the player coordinates in the memory by scanning all
the variables in the memory and then moving the character and removing those variables
from consideration that did not change when the character moved (Figure 26). In this way,
the cheater can narrow down the actual variables that represent the player coordinates.
Furthermore, the cheater can then utilize the location of these values to map out even
larger data structures in the memory, such as the player object itself. After having the
location of the player object in the memory, the cheater can easily access other values
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related to the player. By having the location of important hidden variables, the cheater
can develop tools that read these variables automatically.
Figure 26: Using memory scanning to narrow down the values that represent player location
We can demonstrate the ease of this method with the number guessing game developed
for this thesis. In this example, we can assume that the game is badly designed and the
correct number is stored in the local memory. We can narrow this number down by playing
a few rounds of the game and looking for variables that change when a new round begins
with a new number. Figure 27 shows the searching of the correct number by using the
popular memory scanning and editing tool Cheat Engine [5].
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(a) Before scanning (b) In the middle of the search
(c) The end of the search
Figure 27: Using Cheat Engine to find the correct number from the game memory
The process of reducing the search to only four values took over ten passes and guessing
the correct numbers two times (Figure 27). The idea was to first search for all values in the
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memory that are between 1-100; the next step was to systematically search for unchanged
values every time a player guessed the wrong number, and then search for changed values
every time someone guessed the correct number and a new number was generated. The
approach was fairly straightforward and reduced the hits from around 200,000 (Figure
27b) to four, as shown in Figure 27c. From the last three hits, we can conclude that the
correct number is either 74 or 8 because the other two memory addresses show garbage
data.
This example illustrates how strong a simple memory scanning tool, such as Cheat Engine,
can really be. In a real game, this method could be used to find all sorts of important
data such as player coordinates. Cheat Engine also has a built-in debugger that can be
attached to the game. The debugger is useful when the cheater wants to see what code
writes or reads from the selected memory address. For instance, in the example game we
could see which part of the program writes and reads the correct number variable and
then we could try to trace back the code to find out important game methods and see how
they are called. Finding important variables is a good entry point into finding other data
to utilize in cheating. Often simple variables such as player health can lead the cheater to
larger data structures, such as the player object which can contain variables like player
position and methods related to the player control.
In the development blog of the popular multiplayer online game League of Legends, Michael
VanKuipers outlines a method that tries to make life hard for memory-searching tools.
The idea of the method is to move the variables once they are changed so the most basic
cheating tools will get confused as the address of the variable changes. The method
also encrypts these values when they are moved, and each value uses a slightly different
encryption method. Figure 28 represents the improved approach that was outlined by the
Riot Games developer Michael VanKuipers [56].
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Figure 28: Anti-cheat method that is resistant to memory scanning
In Figure 28, we can clearly see that after the second pass, the values change their locations
and thus become harder to find because they are no longer in the memory address that the
scanning tool is tracking. Meanwhile, the tracked addresses are now pointing to memory
that is undefined, so it could contain any value. This approach will fool the memory
scanner to find fake variables that end up not being the correct ones even though it looks
like four variables were found like in Figure 28. All the values are encrypted in the heap
so they need to be decrypted before use, which will obviously add some overhead to these
operations. Additional overhead comes from relocating the value. In short, when a variable
is read from the heap, it is read, decrypted, and then the original value is passed on. When
a variable is changed, first the new value is encrypted and then placed in the new location
while the old location is cleared or filled with fake information.
In order to test how much overhead the relocation and encryption scheme generates,
we build a small C++ program that reads and writes a value a million times. This
program has three versions: one with the value relocation and encryption, one with
only value relocation, and one without any protections. Appendix C shows that the
standard method TestWithoutRelocation simply reassigns a normal integer value a
million times without anything extra. In the method TestWithRelocation, the old
value is always deleted and the new value is allocated somewhere else in the heap and a
pointer to the new place is returned. This means that the place where the old pointer
was pointing to becomes undefined and the memory reading tool will just show random
data. TestWithRelocationAndEncryption is a method that first uses a XOR cipher
on the value and then relocates it in the same way as in the previous method. When
benchmarking the functions TestWithRelocation, TestWithRelocationAndEncryption
and TestWithoutRelocation against each other, we get the results shown in Table 3.
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The benchmark was done with 3.6 GHz Intel Core i9, 40 GB 2667 MHz DDR4 running
macOS Mojave 10.14.5.
Action Execution time (ms)
Write value normally 1.544
Relocate value 59.697
Relocate and encrypt value (XOR) 63.851
Table 3: Execution time comparison of writing integer value a million times with three different
methods
In Table 3, we can clearly notice that the normal assignment operation is the fastest by a
large margin, while the value relocation takes almost sixty times more time. The difference
between the method using the value relocation and encryption and the method only using
value relocation is not that big. Although in this comparison we used a simple XOR cipher
for the encryption, in a real situation we would not want to use encryption that is too
heavy, so a simple value transformation serves us for testing purposes. The more complex
the encryption, the more time the encryption and decryption would take on read-and-write
operations. In order to discover the encryption method, the cheater would have to do some
reverse engineering and see how the program encrypts the values. As such, a more complex
encrypting algorithm would be discovered almost as easily as the simple one, which would
render the extra effort useless. The real question should be whether it is worthwhile to
apply the relocation scheme to important variables when considering the performance of
the game. It is not reasonable to universally apply it to every single value in the game,
but only to values that are important, such as the members of a player class. For instance,
it does not matter if the cheater discovers the rendering coordinates of a building in the
memory because everyone knows the static location of the building anyway.
Papadoupolos et al. introduce an alternative method to selectively encrypt memory [36].
This can also be applied to encrypting variables in the heap. They introduce a new
method s_malloc which taints the memory region that it allocates, allowing the program
to know whether a memory address has to be encrypted or decrypted before being accessed
[36]. The custom s_malloc places the size and the starting address of the region at the
beginning of each allocation so the decryptor knows what to decrypt. Papadoupolos et
al. report overheads ranging from ten times to twenty-six times in terms of the execution
time depending on the test. Based on these results, the method using the custom allocator
is faster than the previous method presented in this section. The code in Listing 4 shows
an example of how to use the custom s_malloc method. As we can see, its usage is fully
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similar to malloc so it will not cause any extra effort when allocating memory. It would
even be possible to build a cleaner wrapper on top of the s_malloc to make the code
cleaner.
1 i n t main ( i n t argc , const char ∗ argv [ ] ) {
2 i n t ∗a = ( i n t ∗) s_malloc ( s i z e o f ( i n t ) ) ;
3 ∗a = 5 ;
4 re turn 0 ;
5 }
Listing 4: Allocating memory with the s_malloc method
In the wider context of all anti-cheat methods, memory obfuscation plays an important
role because the code encryption itself does not affect variables in the heap, as it only
encrypts the code (TEXT) section of the program. If the important values in the heap
are not relocated and encrypted, then the cheater can easily find the variables and use
them to go deeper into the code by tracking what addresses read and write them. The
encryption of heap variables is not as essential as code encryption. Even if the heap was
not encrypted, the code found by tracking the variables’ reads and writes would still be
encrypted. This would make it very hard for the cheater to understand the structure of
the program. If the cheater only discovered single variables without understanding the
entire context, the damage would not be as high as it would be if all of the code or the
network traffic was unencrypted.
A proper anti-cheat should contain relocation and encryption of heap variables because it
takes very little development time to implement and the benefit would be very substantial.
Even though the overhead was very high in our tests (Table 3) and somewhat less in
the tests conducted by [36], we can conclude that some form of heap encryption should
at least be used on important variables. The developers need to judge what variables
are important and how many variables can be encrypted while maintaining good game
performance.
Obfuscating memory is a client-side anti-cheat method and thus is fundamentally sus-
ceptible to tampering if the cheater discovers the obfuscation logic. This problem can
be alleviated by other anti-cheat methods, but on its own, memory obfuscation is very
susceptible to meddling.
Implementing the obfuscation logic is not very straightforward, especially if the developer
wants to make it harder to tamper with. Creating the obfuscation scheme with relocation
requires deep knowledge of the working of memory, and as such, it is not trivial to
build.
When it comes to overhead, memory obfuscation and relocation will cause overhead
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regardless of how they are implemented because the game has to take extra steps to resolve
the needed value from the memory, as demonstrated in this section. However, depending
on the frequency of memory access and the obfuscation scheme, the overhead can be very
low and not noticeable at all.
Memory obfuscation only works within the memory space of the game itself and thus does
not affect other programs or the users’ privacy. Memory obfuscation is a very low-level
anti-cheat technique and is totally independent of the type of game it is used on.
Despite all its flaws, memory obfuscation is one of most powerful client-side anti-cheat
techniques and should be part of any serious anti-cheat system. At the very least, memory
obfuscation can be used to defend the other anti-cheat methods from tampering by
obfuscating the memory that they use.
7.5 Kernel-based anti-cheat driver
Many anti-cheat systems are built as standard programs that operate in the user space.
This means that they are limited in their ability to protect the game. They are also easier
for the cheaters to bypass. Another increasingly popular option is building the anti-cheat
system as a kernel driver that operates in the kernel space. The previously mentioned,
BattleEye and Easy Anti-Cheat are examples of kernel-based anti-cheat drivers that spy
on requests for interfacing with the game process memory. For instance, if a cheat program
tries to open a handle to the game process, the kernel driver will detect this and block
it.
User space Kernel space
Memory access Limited access Full access
Hardware access No direct access Full access
Access to CPU instructions Only unprivileged instructions All instructions
Access to critical OS data structures No access Full access
Table 4: Comparison of user space and kernel space privileges
Figure 29 demonstrates how the kernel-level anti-cheat works by communicating with the
game process in the user space. The user space program and the kernel can exchange
messages. We can see from Table 4 that kernel drivers also have full access to the memory.
In essence, kernel drivers can do anything on the computer while user space programs are
limited in their access to memory and CPU instructions. These facts make kernel-based
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anti-cheat drivers powerful tools for scanning the memory for signs of cheating programs
and also for protecting the user space executable.
Figure 29: Kernel mode anti-cheat communicates with the game in user mode
The kernel anti-cheat driver can intercept harmful actions that try to affect the memory
of the game. For example, Figure 30 shows the kernel anti-cheat driver intercepting an
attempt to write to the game memory. In this case, the cheat program could be trying to
edit game textures to make it easier to see other players, for instance. Once the kernel
driver intercepts and blocks the cheating attempt, it can close down the game and report
the cheating to the server so action can be taken against the cheater. The driver can
also collect identifiers from the cheat program and send them to the server for further
analysis.
Figure 30: Kernel mode anti-cheat protects the game process
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On a practical level, the kernel driver can hook into important system methods that
cheats utilize. On Windows, some of the methods commonly used for cheating are:
WriteProcessMemory [61], CreateRemoteThread [59], and SetWindowsHookExA [60]. When
the cheat program tries to call these methods, the method calls go through the kernel
driver first, where their arguments can be analyzed. The kernel driver can terminate
the game process if it suspects that the called system method is being used for cheating,
otherwise the method will be allowed to run as normal. Figure 31 illustrates an example
of inline hooking [21] on a Windows system method WriteProcessMemory. We can see
that in the hooked method the first line is replaced with a jmp instruction to a custom
anti-cheat memory section. In this section, the anti-cheat can inspect the arguments of
the call to determine whether it is being used for cheating. The anti-cheat can also send
data back to the server. At the end of the anti-cheat section, there is a jmp instruction to
a section with the original code that was replaced by the jmp instruction in the original
WriteProcessMemory function. In the end, the control is returned to the next instruction
in the hooked method. Hooking of system methods makes the kernel-level anti-cheat a
very powerful tool because it works on a very low-level and is not attached to the game
executable.
Figure 31: Inline hook for Windows system function WriteProcessMemory
The main weakness of kernel-based anti-cheat drivers is that the cheat developers can
also develop their own cheats as kernel drivers which can effectively bypass the detection.
According to the developers of the popular competitive shooting game PlayerUnknown’s
Battlegrounds, there are indications that many cheaters are moving their cheats to work
in the kernel space to avoid detection [2]. This trend is predictable and is a result of
kernel-level anti-cheats becoming more common. The developers noted that defending
against kernel-level cheats has been very difficult compared to standard user space cheats.
They also report that cheaters are abusing illegally traded certificates to sign the kernel
drives that are used for cheating [2].
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When it comes to tampering resistance, kernel-level anti-cheat drivers are the best among
all different client-side anti-cheat methods. Bypassing them requires the cheat itself to
be on the kernel level, which in turn requires the cheat developer to have the skills to
write kernel-level drivers on the operating system that the cheat is being made for. The
cheaters could also analyze the anti-cheat driver and find vulnerabilities to exploit, but
it would also require good skills in reverse engineering, especially at the kernel-level. In
addition, at least on Windows and macOS operating systems, kernel drivers need to be
signed in order to work. The operating system vendor, in this case Apple and Microsoft,
needs to grant the developer the certificate to be able to sign the driver. This requires an
application from the developer [47][23]. There are ways to bypass this, such as running
the driver in debug mode or using a vulnerable driver that allows programs from the user
mode to execute code in the kernel mode. One example of this type of vulnerable driver is
the Capcom driver that is installed with the PC version of Street Fighter V. The driver
opens a backdoor which allows users to execute code in the kernel space [45][42]. In short,
without a kernel-level cheat program, it is difficult to avoid kernel-based anti-cheat.
Kernel-level anti-cheat can be hard to implement for developers with little to no experience
in kernel driver programming. Kernel driver development requires a deep understating of
how the specific operating system communicates between programs on the user space and
drivers on the kernel space. In the case of kernel-level anti-cheats, developer skill is more
important compared to other methods because there is a risk of creating new exploits
with vulnerable kernel drivers. For instance, the aforementioned Capcom driver opened
an exploit for every program to run code in the kernel space [42]. This included malware
as well. An unskilled developer should not attempt to create a kernel-level anti-cheat
driver because in the worst case it can be vulnerable to exploitation and can put users’
computers at risk.
In terms of overhead, kernel-level anti-cheat systems should not generate any more overhead
than systems running on the user mode. The overhead depends strictly on what kind of
functionality the system performs. Often it protects the game executable by preventing
other programs from accessing its memory. In the usual use cases, the overhead is minimal
and should not factor into the decision to use a kernel-level anti-cheat.
In the worst-case scenarios, kernel space anti-cheat systems can be very invasive because
they have full access to the memory in the user space, which means that they can
theoretically snoop around the memory space and gain access to private information.
This concern has been raised regarding the use of kernel drivers, and they have even
been compared to rootkits [37]. It is up to the developer to maintain ethics and use the
kernel-level driver responsibly. Kernel-mode anti-cheats are game agnostic, so they are
suitable for all types of games.
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It can be argued that out of all the client-side anti-cheat methods, the kernel-level anti-
cheat driver is the most effective, especially if it is implemented in the correct way. It can
also be combined with some of the other client-side anti-cheat methods in order to make
them more effective. For example, file verification by hashing and detection of known cheat
programs can be implemented by the kernel driver to enhance their tampering resistance.
All this makes kernel drivers a very powerful tool in the fight against cheating.
8 Comparison of anti-cheat methods
This chapter will draw a comparison between the anti-cheat methods covered in this thesis.
All methods will be rated from one to four (1-4) with four being the best score and one
being the worst. The methods will be rated with five different criteria: resistance to
tampering, ease of implementation, lack of overhead, non-invasiveness, and suitability for
















Not trusting the client 4 2 2 4 3
Tampering resistant ap-
plication protocol
4 2 2 4 4
Obfuscating the network
traffic
2 4 3 4 4
Statistical methods 3 1 4 4 2
Client-side methods
Code encryption 2 1 2 4 4
Verifying files by hashing 1 4 4 3 4
Detecting known cheat
programs
1 2 4 1 4
Obfuscating memory 2 2 2 4 4
Kernel-based anti-cheat
driver
3 2 4 2 4
Table 5: Comparison of different anti-cheat methods
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When we look at the client-side and server-side anti-cheat methods as a whole, we can
conclude that the client-side methods are much more susceptible to tampering than the
server-side methods. As discussed in Chapter 6, the fundamental limits of client-side
anti-cheat methods make them bad in terms of tampering resistance. If the cheater has
access to the client machine, it is impossible to fully protect the game in a foolproof
manner. A lot can be done to improve tamper resistance, but tampering cannot be
totally ruled out. Despite being strong anti-cheat methods, even code encryption and
obfuscated memory can be bypassed by a skilful cheater who has enough time. Out of
all the client-side anti-cheat methods, the kernel-based anti-cheat driver was found out
to be the most tampering resistant. This is because the kernel-level anti-cheat module
operates in kernel mode, which puts it out of reach of cheats that only operate in user
mode. While the server-side methods are superior to the client-side methods in terms of
tampering resistance, it does not mean that they are superior as a whole because there
are certain types of cheats that the server-side methods simply cannot easily catch. For
instance, in Chapter 2 we mentioned wallhacks that edit game textures so the cheater can
see through walls. By using pure server-side methods, it is very difficult to catch this type
of cheating.
In terms of being easy to implement, there is no major difference between client-side
and server-side methods. We can observe that the obfuscation of network traffic is the
easiest method to implement. This is due to the fact that encryption and decryption
only have to be handled in a single place in the code. On the other hand, statistical
methods are usually hard to implement because they need large amounts of suitable data,
as was covered in Section 5.4. Out of the client-side methods, the code encryption is the
hardest to implement in such a way that it is hard for the cheaters to bypass. A naive
method, like using a premade executable packing tool as demonstrated in Section 6.1, is
always relatively fast and easy to apply, but actually creating a partial encryption scheme
will take a skilled developer a lot of time. The ease of implementation is something that
should be considered when developing anti-cheat, especially if the development team has
constraints when it comes to skills or time. However, the ease of implementation should
never be the main driver for developing any anti-cheat. On the contrary, the server-side
methods are very tamper-resistant since the client does not have access to the server-side.
The network traffic obfuscation stands out as being easy to tamper with, because if the
cheater manages to figure out the encryption algorithm and finds the encryption key, all
the packets can be decrypted and fake packets can also be sent with the same encryption.
If a cheater manages to feed the server with fake data in large quantities, it can interfere
with the statistical methods and cause issues for the anti-cheat.
The overhead of different methods can be a concern for certain types of games that are
dependent on a very smooth game flow. None of the methods really stand out in this
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regard, but it is clear that out of the client-side methods, code-encryption and memory
obfuscation create the most overhead because they need to be performed as often as
encrypted methods are run and memory is accessed. During the execution of the program,
the memory is constantly being read and written and methods are executed continuously.
In general, the more times the method is run and the longer it takes, the more overhead is
generated. For instance, statistical methods generate no overhead when they are applied
correctly. This is because they can be run on different machines and not in the same
pipeline as other game actions. Even today with very powerful computers and mobile
devices, overhead can become an issue; for example, if code encryption is used for a large
method that is run almost constantly. None of the methods will cause excessive overhead
if they are applied reasonably, but when using the selected method, the developers should
pay extra attention to overhead if the method has a low score in the lack of overhead
column. With code encryption, the developers should exercise special caution and try to
only encrypt the most important methods.
Invasiveness of anti-cheat has been a concern in recent years, as noted in Chapter 3. Users
are becoming increasingly concerned about their privacy and thus anti-cheat developers
should consider the privacy concerns of the various anti-cheat methods. If we look at
all the methods as a whole, we can notice that the server-side methods have close to
no privacy concerns because they do not operate on the client computers. As for the
client-side anti-cheat methods, the detection of known cheat programs has to rely on some
kind of marker, such as process names and window titles, but these may contain personal
info like credit card numbers. This information can be misused when it is sent to the server
for analysis. When implementing the detection system for existing cheat programs, it is
very important to pay attention to what kind of data is being scanned and transmitted
to the server. It is also recommended to have policies within the company regarding the
analysis of this data in the case that something very sensitive gets transmitted.
The privacy concerns become particularly serious if the anti-cheat operates on the kernel
level, as kernel-level drivers can access everything on the user’s computer. In some cases,
file hashes can also give out information about some programs that the user uses, which
demands particular attention from the developers. The European Union has introduced
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which gives EU citizens a lot of rights
when it comes to the usage of their data. For instance, these rights include the right to be
forgotten, which means that the company is obliged to remove the user’s data if the user
requests it [18]. In terms of invasiveness, it is obvious from the results that the developer
should prefer server-side anti-cheat whenever possible. However, as pointed out in the
analysis, server-side methods have limitations that make it unfeasible to use them on their
own.
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Most anti-cheat methods are suitable for all types of games but various concerns need to be
taken into consideration based on game type. We can notice that statistical methods are
not very suitable for some types of games. As explored in Chapter 6, Section 4, statistical
methods require a large amount of suitable data, which means that the playerbase of the
game has to be large enough. Some games do not attract that many players or they do not
necessarily have the kind of data that lends itself well to analysis by statistical methods.
In Chapter 6, Section 1, we explored how to build a client-server system that does not
blindly trust what comes from the client. We noted that in some cases it can be reasonable
to build a system that does not verify everything on the server side. For instance, we
pointed out that in some countries the internet connections are very unreliable. In Chapter
6, we used some mobile games as an example. In these types of situations, it can be
reasonable to save bandwidth and server resources by simulating more things in the client.
However, this will open many cheating opportunities. This is why sometimes it is not
straightforward to build a totally foolproof system in terms of trusting the client data.
All the other anti-cheat methods are game-type independent and do not require further
consideration related to that.
9 Future of Anti-Cheat
None of the client-side anti-cheat methods are totally safe from tampering, as we have
noted throughout this thesis. This is one reason why the future trends of the anti-cheat
systems seem to heavily prefer server-side methods. Unless the player has access to the
server, it is very difficult to tamper with the server-side methods if they are correctly
implemented. This chapter takes a look into promising avenues that state-of-the-art
anti-cheat systems are already starting to utilize or that they can start utilizing in the
near future.
9.1 Utilizing machine learning and the cloud
In Chapter 5, Section 4, this thesis discussed the use of statistical methods in detecting
cheating. Overall, these methods were found to be very effective and non-invasive, but
they required large amounts of data that all games do not have. Sometimes it is hard to
differentiate statistical methods from machine learning, and different groups have different
definitions of these two concepts. In this thesis, techniques that utilize deep neural networks
are classified as machine learning instead of pure statistical methods.
Machine learning is starting to be increasingly utilized in the anti-cheat space. For example,
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Valve is utilizing deep learning to catch cheaters. According to Valve’s John McDonald,
Valve’s current machine learning system VACnet detects cheaters and then submits the
cases to the Overwatch system for the players to review and judge [29]. McDonald stated
that the implementation of the VACnet boosted the conviction rate of cheaters in the
Overwatch system from 15%-30% to 80%-95% [29]. It is a staggering increase that clearly
shows the VACnet is detecting people who are obviously cheating. However, McDonald
also noted that the current implementation of the VACnet can only catch players that are
clearly cheating by a significant margin. For instance, if a cheater sets a weapon to hit
on every shot, then the machine learning system will detect it. If the cheater makes the
weapon only hit 60% of the time, then the system might not catch it since it is not very
obvious [29]. This highlights the weakness of the current implementation. With more time
and more data, the accuracy of the system should improve.
Easy Anti-Cheat is a good example of a SaaS (Software as a service) anti-cheat system
that partly operates in the cloud and partly on the client machine. It is used in many
popular games such as Fortnite and is somewhat similar to older programs like nProtect
GameGuard and Hack Shield. Many of the older systems, such as nProtect GameGuard,
acted as rootkits when they were installed on the client machine, which today is heavily
criticized due to the very malware-like invasive functionality. In Chapter 5, Section 4, we
briefly looked into Fairfight, an anti-cheat system that purely operates on the server-side.
It is also utilized in many popular games such as Battlefield V. Easy Anti-Cheat and
Fairfight represent the next generation of anti-cheats that are at least partly run in the
cloud and that utilize large amounts of data to detect cheaters.
In an era when privacy is becoming more and more important, the machine learning
approach is much more preferable over a system that continuously scans the client computer.
If the machine-learning-based system is operated on a cloud by a third-party company,
it is also a good deal in terms of development cost and scalability. The game company
itself does not need specialized people who are solely focused on anti-cheat as that has
been externalized to another company. The external company would be fully specialized
in anti-cheat development and have deep expertise in this area compared to most game
companies that have few people developing their anti-cheats. The main weakness of
the machine learning approach is that there can be a situation where the system learns
something wrong, and this can be hard to notice afterwards. There is also the possibility of
making false decisions based on the statistics. There is no doubt that these types of fully
server-side, data-science-utilizing anti-cheat systems will become more and more common
as cheats on the client-side become more and more sophisticated. However, because
machine-learning-based anti-cheat is totally on the server-side, it is very hard to detect
client-side cheats such as wallhacks if the cheater uses them stealthily. Despite the power
of the machine learning systems, it is hard to see a future where machine-learning-based
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solutions overtake all other forms of anti-cheat.
9.2 Streaming games over the internet
A promising avenue for future anti-cheat is moving the game totally to the server-side,
which would eliminate all possibility of using client-side cheating pathways. In practice,
this would mean that video of the game is streamed to the players and the keyboard
or controller inputs are relayed to the server over the internet. Now the only avenue of
cheating would be to exploit the text input to cause a buffer overflow or exploit some
other vulnerability (as briefly mentioned at the start of the Chapter 6). Assuming that
the whole game is run on the server side and free of vulnerabilities, the system would be
very close to being waterproof as long as the players did not have any access to the server.
A good example of a game streaming system is Google’s Stadia. Stadia runs the games on
the cloud and the end user downloads the Stadia application on the chosen device. The
user can then use the Stadia application to purchase and play games. The system has a
free tier that allows users to stream games on 1080p and 60fps, but the monthly payment
option allows streaming up to 4k and 60fps [43]. Whether Stadia succeeds remains to be
seen, as there have been similar streaming services, such as OnLive, that have closed down
[26].
Obviously moving the game totally to the server-side would introduce many other problems
such as the requirement for having a fast internet connection in order to stream the game
with high-quality video. There would also be more latency because firstly, the keyboard
or controller input would have to travel to the server, and the updated video would have
to be streamed back to the player. In a standard client-server situation, the game client
would move the character locally instantly and the input would be sent at the same time,
which would make the game appear very smooth.
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Figure 32: Cheat program writes to the memory of the game that is running inside a virtual
machine
A big problem plaguing modern games is the use of virtual machines in cheating. The
cheaters run the virtual machines inside their own computers. Figure 32 shows a cheat
program operating inside the client machine that is running the virtual machine. The
cheat program can be seen writing to the memory of the game that is run inside the virtual
machine. Detecting this type of cheating is a very hard problem to solve because the host
computer can access the virtual machine from the outside but the virtual machine cannot
see the host machine, as it is totally isolated from it. This creates a big opportunity for
cheaters to play the game on a virtual machine and use the cheats on the host machine
to manipulate the state of the virtual machine. Currently games use certain methods,
such as looking for virtualized environment artifacts like registry keys, hard disk names,
and drivers, to detect whether the machine running the game is in fact a virtual machine.
Usually, if the anti-cheat detects a virtual machine, it will block the player from the
game. However, a smart cheater can still manage to bypass all these checks and fool the
anti-cheat to believe that it is not being run on a virtual machine. Streaming the game
would also provide a viable solution to the virtual machine problem, which can otherwise
be challenging to tackle with traditional anti-cheat methods.
While streaming games over the internet makes cheating extremely difficult, in reality, it
can be hard to convince players to give up control of their game clients and make them use
game streaming services. Some games such as first-person shooters (FPS) require very low
latency, and video streaming can make playing those games very uncomfortable because
of the extra delay. Some people, especially in developing countries, still have very slow
internet connections, which makes this type of system outright impossible for those players.
In the future internet connections will become better and better, so the latency will be less
of a problem. When services transition to online, the ownership of the products can also
become a concern. For instance, when OnLive shut down, the users who had purchased
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the company’s PlayPass games could no longer access their games. The company gave
refunds to certain eligible users [26]. The case of OnLive certainly does not increase the
users’ faith in game streaming services.
10 Conclusion
This thesis looked at the various anti-cheat methods that are used today and compared
them across five different categories: resistance to tampering, ease of implementation, lack
of overhead, non-invasiveness, and suitability for a wide variety of games.
Server-side anti-cheat methods were overall quite resistant to tampering due to the client
not having physical access to the server, but at the same time, it is hard for them to detect
cheats like wallhacks that rely on modifying client-side data such as textures. Network
traffic obfuscation was found to be relatively easy to tamper with in comparison to the
other methods. Server-side methods were found to be as difficult to implement as client-side
methods overall.
When it comes to overhead, code encryption and memory obfuscation generated the most
overhead due to the fact that they are run constantly. We concluded that developers
should think carefully about which situations to apply these methods. In the case of
code encryption, we presented an improved method where encrypted methods would
be determined by a specific formula and the developers could manually exempt certain
methods from being encrypted. We showed a faster method of memory obfuscation
where a custom malloc method was used to allocate memory. The method tainted the
memory region that it allocated to the game data. This allowed the program to know
if a memory address had to be encrypted or decrypted before accessing it. Among the
server-side anti-cheat methods, the tamper-resistant application protocol and the principle
of not trusting the client were concluded to introduce some overhead compared to naive
implementations.
In terms of non-invasiveness, the server-side methods were not found to be invasive because
of their fundamental nature of acting on the server. The detection of known cheat programs
stood out as the most invasive client-side anti-cheat method, as it often accesses identifiers
such as window titles and process names that can contain sensitive information like credit
card numbers. This can be avoided by having company policies regarding the handling of
this type of information. Kernel-based anti-cheat drivers were also found to be invasive
since they have full access to the user space memory. In theory, this could mean that
the anti-cheat could spy on everything the user does, which places a lot of responsibility
on the game developer. Despite the privacy concerns, we determined that kernel-based
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anti-cheat drivers and the detection of known cheat programs are powerful methods at
curbing cheating.
All of the methods except two were suitable for all types of games. Statistical methods
and not trusting the client were concluded to have some limitations based on the game
type and the number of players. Statistical methods need large amounts of relevant data
to make conclusions. Many smaller games might not have the number of players required
for this, which limits the options of applying statistical methods for anti-cheat purposes.
In some situations, there might also be constraints that make it very difficult to build the
server in a way that the client is never trusted directly. As an example, we explained that
some mobile games that operate in areas with a bad internet connection might have to
compromise on their anti-cheat systems because making the game more cheat-proof would
generate much more network traffic.
We concluded that new anti-cheat methods are needed to address the fundamental short-
comings of the current methods. When we looked at the future of anti-cheat, we highlighted
the use of machine learning solutions where large amounts of data would be used in so-
phisticated ways to catch cheaters. As an example, we looked at the Valve’s new VACnet
anti-cheat that managed to boost the conviction rate of cheaters from 15%-30% to 80%-
95%. We also looked into Fairfight, which is a purely server-side cloud-based anti-cheat
that works on game data that the developer specifies. We concluded that the cloud-based
methods would become more popular because they are easy for the developers to hook
into their games. By using these kinds of systems, the developers do not need to worry
about maintaining the anti-cheat while they are maintaining their game. The developers
do not need special skills that are required in anti-cheat development.
In terms of preventing cheating, it was concluded that streaming games over the internet
is the most effective method. This would isolate the game from the players, and essentially
the only thing that would be transmitted is the input from the player and the video
stream of the game from the server. It was also shown that game streaming still has many
obstacles and might not fundamentally be suitable for certain types of games that require
very low latency. Issues of the game ownership, in the case that the service is shut down,
were also raised.
The overall trend, as seen from the widely used commercial anti-cheat systems, seems to
be moving towards server-side solutions as a whole. On the client-side, both cheats and
anti-cheat systems are quickly moving to the kernel space. The results of the comparison
give supporting evidence of this trend in the sense that server-side methods are much
more tamper-resistant and often less invasive than their client-side counterparts. Many
products, such as Easy-Anti Cheat and Fairfight, are being built to act as cloud-based
anti-cheat solutions that the developers can easily plug into their games and let external
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companies handle the anti-cheat.
Based on the comparison, it is clear that the developers should prefer server-side methods
over client-side ones but they should also understand that server-side solutions cannot
prevent all types of cheating, such as client-side texture modifications that, for example,
could allow the cheater to see through walls.
On the server-side, the developer should ideally implement all the server-side methods
that were examined in this thesis as they can work in a synergistic manner and do not
interfere with each other.
On the client-side, the developer should focus on implementing good memory obfuscation
and code-encryption. If possible, a kernel-based anti-cheat driver should be built to
protect the user-level game executable from tampering. The kernel-level module could
also do memory scanning for known cheats. File hashing was found to be redundant
and susceptible to tampering so it should be placed below the other methods in terms
of priority. In the future, if the internet connection speeds have developed enough and if
the game does not require very low latency, the developer can also consider building the
game as a fully streamed service where only the player inputs are sent to the server and a
video stream of the game is returned back. This would almost totally eliminate client-side
cheating. Among all anti-cheat methods we explored, both present and future options, the
streaming solution was found to be the most resilient against cheating.
The fight against online cheating is more important than ever as more and more game
companies earn their revenue from online games and players compete in tournaments
that have price pools reaching millions of dollars. This thesis provided an overview and
comparison of widely used anti-cheat methods alongside a view into the future of anti-cheat.
With a better understanding of the different anti-cheat methods, the developers can spend
their time more efficiently and focus on implementing an anti-cheat system that is best
suitable for their game. The knowledge in this thesis can also help the game developers in
purchasing an existing commercial anti-cheat service that they can integrate into their
game. Without effective anti-cheat, it is almost impossible for a game to become very
popular as players will quit if their game experience is hindered by unfair play. All in all,
online cheating is not going to disappear any time soon, which means that new methods
and a better understanding of the existing methods are required to have a chance in the
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Appendices
A Guessing game server
1 //
2 // GameManager . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f GameManager_hpp
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10 #de f i n e GameManager_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
14 #inc lude <s t r i ng>
15 #inc lude <random>
16 #inc lude "MatchMaker . hpp "
17 #inc lude " PacketHandler . hpp "
18 #inc lude "OpCodes . hpp "
19 #inc lude " Player . hpp "
20
21 enum Authent i cat ionStatus {
22 WAITING_FOR_AUTHENTICATION = f a l s e ,
23 AUTHENTICATED = true ,
24 } ;
25
26 c l a s s GameManager {
27 pub l i c :
28 void SendAuthenticationHash ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender ,
i n t port ) ;
29 void PlayerAuthent icated ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender , i n t
port ) ;
30 void PlayerEnterMatchMaking ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender ,
i n t port ) ;
31 void PlayerGuessNumber ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender , i n t
port ) ;
32 void ConfirmGameIntegrity ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender , i n t
port ) ;
33
34 void MatchFound( std : : shared_ptr<Match> match ) ;
35 void HandleGameMessage ( ) ;
36 GameManager ( PacketHandler ∗ packetHandler ) ;
37
38 pr i va t e :
39 std : : s t r i n g GenerateAuthenticat ionHash ( ) ;
40 bool Ver i fyAuthent icat ionHash ( std : : s t r i n g hash ) ;
41 void SetAuthent icat ionStatusForHash ( std : : s t r i n g hash ,
Authent i cat ionStatus s t a tu s ) ;
42 void RegisterOpCodes ( ) ;
43 void AddPlayerToMatchMaking ( ) ;
44 void RemovePlayerFromMatchMaking ( ) ;
45 void SendMatchFoundPacket ( std : : shared_ptr<Match> match ) ;
46 void SendGameIntegrityConfirmedPacket ( s f : : IpAddress address , i n t port ) ;
47 void SendNewRoundPacket ( std : : shared_ptr<Match> match ) ;
48 bool ValidateAuthenticationHashFromPacket ( s f : : Packet ∗ packet ) ;
49 s f : : Packet CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes opCode ) ;
50 std : : s t r i n g GetAuthenticationHash ( s f : : Packet packet ) ;
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51
52 s f : : Packet CreateAuthent icat ionPacket ( std : : s t r i n g authent icat ionHash ) ;
53
54 std : : s t r i n g mGameIntegrityHashOSX = " 15546534240171485050 " ;
55 std : : s t r i n g mGameIntegrityHashWindows = " 53451231231231241 " ;
56
57 std : : unordered_map<std : : s t r i ng , int> mPlayerPorts ;
58 std : : unordered_map<std : : s t r i ng , Authent icat ionStatus>
mAuthenticationMap ;
59 std : : unordered_map<std : : s t r i ng , std : : shared_ptr<Player>> mPlayers ;
60 std : : unordered_map<int , std : : shared_ptr<Match>> mOngoingMatches ;
61
62 std : : shared_ptr<Match> GetMatchWithId ( i n t id ) ;
63
64 PacketHandler ∗ mPacketHandler ;
65 MatchMaker mMatchMaker ;
66 } ;
67
68 #end i f /∗ GameManager_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // GameManager . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude "GameManager . hpp "
10
11 GameManager : : GameManager ( PacketHandler ∗ packetHandler ) : mPacketHandler (
packetHandler ) , mMatchMaker (3 , s td : : bind(&GameManager : : MatchFound , th i s ,
s td : : p l a c eho l d e r s : : _1) ) {
12 th i s−>RegisterOpCodes ( ) ;
13 }
14
15 s f : : Packet GameManager : : CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes opCode ) {
16 s f : : Packet packet ;
17 packet << opCode ;
18 re turn packet ;
19 }
20
21 // Sends packet to a l l p l ay e r s in match , i n d i c a t i n g that a match has began
22 void GameManager : : SendMatchFoundPacket ( std : : shared_ptr<Match> match ) {
23 s f : : Packet packet = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes : :
SERVER_MATCH_STARTED) ;
24 packet << match−>GetMatchId ( ) ;
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25 packet << match−>GetNumberToGuess ( ) ;
26 packet << match−>GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( )−>GetName ( ) ;
27
28 f o r ( const auto & player : match−>GetPlayers ( ) ) {
29 packet << player−>GetName ( ) ;
30 }
31
32 f o r ( const auto & player : match−>GetPlayers ( ) ) {
33 s f : : Packet packetToSend = packet ;
34 i f (match−>GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( ) == player ) {
35 packetToSend << true ;
36 } e l s e {
37 packetToSend << f a l s e ;
38 }
39 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packetToSend , player−>GetAddress ( )




43 std : : shared_ptr<Match> GameManager : : GetMatchWithId ( i n t id ) {
44 t ry {
45 std : : shared_ptr<Match> match = th i s−>mOngoingMatches [ id ] ;
46 re turn match ;
47 } catch ( std : : except ion & except ion ) {




52 void GameManager : : MatchFound( std : : shared_ptr<Match> match ) {
53 // Add match
54 th i s−>mOngoingMatches [ match−>GetMatchId ( ) ] = match ;
55 th i s−>SendMatchFoundPacket (match ) ;
56 }
57








66 void GameManager : : SendNewRoundPacket ( std : : shared_ptr<Match> match ) {
67 match−>SetNextTurnPlayer ( ) ;
68 match−>SetNewNumberToGuess ( ) ;
69 s f : : Packet newRoundPacket = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes : :
SERVER_NEW_ROUND) ;
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70 newRoundPacket << match−>GetNumberToGuess ( ) ;
71 f o r ( const auto & player : match−>GetPlayers ( ) ) {
72 s f : : Packet packetToSend = newRoundPacket ;
73 i f ( p laye r == match−>GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( ) ) {
74 packetToSend << true ;
75 } e l s e {
76 packetToSend << f a l s e ;
77 }
78 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packetToSend , player−>GetAddress ( )




82 void GameManager : : PlayerGuessNumber ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender
, i n t port ) {
83 i f ( th i s−>ValidateAuthenticationHashFromPacket(&packet ) ) {
84 i n t matchId ;
85 i n t number ;
86 packet >> matchId ;
87 packet >> number ;
88 std : : shared_ptr<Match> match = th i s−>GetMatchWithId (matchId ) ;
89 i f (match != nu l l p t r ) {
90 std : : shared_ptr<Player> gue s s e r = match−>
GetPlayerWithAddressAndPort ( sender , port ) ;
91 i f ( gue s s e r == match−>GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( ) ) {
92 {
93 i f ( number == match−>GetNumberToGuess ( ) ) {
94 // Star t new round
95 th i s−>SendNewRoundPacket (match ) ;
96
97 } e l s e {
98 s f : : Packet wrongPacket = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (
OpCodes : :SERVER_WRONG_NUMBER) ;
99 wrongPacket << number ;
100 i f ( number < match−>GetNumberToGuess ( ) ) {
101 wrongPacket << −1;
102 } e l s e i f ( number > match−>GetNumberToGuess ( ) ) {
103 wrongPacket << 1 ;
104 } e l s e {
105 wrongPacket << 0 ;
106 }
107 f o r ( const auto & player : match−>GetPlayers ( ) ) {
108 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( wrongPacket ,
p layer−>GetAddress ( ) , p layer−>GetPort ( ) , p layer−>GetAuthenticationHash ( )
) ;
109 }
110 // Change turn , a l s o inform gues s e r about the wrong
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r e s u l t
111 match−>SetNextTurnPlayer ( ) ;
112 s f : : Packet packet = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (
OpCodes : :SERVER_SET_TURN) ;
113 packet << match−>GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( )−>GetName ( ) ;
114 f o r ( const auto & player : match−>GetPlayers ( ) ) {
115 s f : : Packet packetToSend = packet ;
116 i f ( p laye r == match−>GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( ) ) {
117 packetToSend << true ;
118 } e l s e {
119 packetToSend << f a l s e ;
120 }
121 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packetToSend ,










130 void GameManager : : SendGameIntegrityConfirmedPacket ( s f : : IpAddress address ,
i n t port ) {
131 s f : : Packet packet = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes : :
SERVER_CONFIRM_GAME_INTEGRITY) ;
132 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packet , address , port , f a l s e ) ;
133 }
134
135 void GameManager : : ConfirmGameIntegrity ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
136 std : : s t r i n g hash ;
137 packet >> hash ;
138 i f ( hash == th i s−>mGameIntegrityHashOSX | | hash == th i s−>
mGameIntegrityHashWindows ) {
139 th i s−>SendGameIntegrityConfirmedPacket ( sender , port ) ;
140 } e l s e {




145 void GameManager : : RegisterOpCodes ( ) {
146 // Reg i s t e r a l l opcodes to hand le r s here
147 us ing namespace std : : p l a c eho l d e r s ;
148
149 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :
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USER_REQUEST_AUTHENTICATION_HASH, std : : bind(&GameManager : :
SendAuthenticationHash , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) ) ;
150 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :
USER_MATCHMAKING_ENTER_QUEUE, std : : bind(&GameManager : :
PlayerEnterMatchMaking , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) , t rue ) ;
151 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :USER_AUTHENTICATED,
std : : bind(&GameManager : : PlayerAuthent icated , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) ) ;
152 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :USER_GUESS_NUMBER, std
: : bind(&GameManager : : PlayerGuessNumber , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) , t rue ) ;
153 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :USER_SEND_FILE_HASH,
std : : bind(&GameManager : : ConfirmGameIntegrity , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) ) ;
154 }
155
156 bool GameManager : : ValidateAuthenticationHashFromPacket ( s f : : Packet ∗ packet )
{
157 std : : s t r i n g hash ;
158 ∗packet >> hash ;
159 t ry {
160 i f ( th i s−>mAuthenticationMap . at ( hash ) == AUTHENTICATED) {
161 re turn true ;
162 }
163 } catch ( std : : except ion & except ion ) {
164 std : : cout << " Authent icat ion e r r o r " ;
165 re turn f a l s e ;
166 }
167 re turn f a l s e ;
168 }
169
170 std : : s t r i n g GameManager : : GetAuthenticationHash ( s f : : Packet packet ) {
171 std : : s t r i n g hash ;
172 packet >> hash ;
173 re turn hash ;
174 }
175
176 void GameManager : : PlayerEnterMatchMaking ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
177 std : : s t r i n g hash = th i s−>GetAuthenticationHash ( packet ) ;
178
179 i f ( th i s−>ValidateAuthenticationHashFromPacket(&packet ) ) {
180 // Create p laye r ob j e c t
181 std : : s t r i n g name ;
182 packet >> name ;
183 std : : shared_ptr<Player> p layer (new Player ( sender , name , hash , th i s
−>mPlayerPorts [ hash ] ) ) ;
184 th i s−>mPlayers [ hash ] = p layer ;









193 void GameManager : : SetAuthent icat ionStatusForHash ( std : : s t r i n g hash ,
Authent i cat ionStatus s t a tu s ) {
194 i f ( s t a tu s == AUTHENTICATED) {
195 t ry {
196 i f ( th i s−>mAuthenticationMap . at ( hash ) ==
WAITING_FOR_AUTHENTICATION) {
197 th i s−>mAuthenticationMap [ hash ] = AUTHENTICATED;
198 }
199 } catch ( std : : except ion & except ion ) {
200 // Error with au then t i c a t i on
201 }
202 } e l s e {




207 void GameManager : : PlayerAuthent icated ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
208 std : : s t r i n g hash ;
209 packet >> hash ;
210 th i s−>SetAuthent icat ionStatusForHash ( hash , AUTHENTICATED) ;
211 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SetEncryptionKeyForAddress ( sender , port , hash ) ;
212 }
213
214 s f : : Packet GameManager : : CreateAuthent icat ionPacket ( std : : s t r i n g
authent icat ionHash ) {
215 s f : : Packet packet ;
216 packet << OpCodes : :SERVER_GIVE_AUTHENTICATION_HASH;
217 packet << authent icat ionHash ;
218 re turn packet ;
219 }
220
221 std : : s t r i n g GameManager : : GenerateAuthenticat ionHash ( ) {
222 std : : mt19937_64 gen{ std : : random_device {}( ) } ;
223 std : : un i form_int_dis t r ibut ion<short> d i s t { ’ a ’ , ’ z ’ } ;
224 i n t l ength = 30 ;
225 std : : s t r i n g s t r ( length , ’ \0 ’ ) ;
226 f o r ( auto& c : s t r ) {
227 c = d i s t ( gen ) ;
228 }




232 void GameManager : : SendAuthenticationHash ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
233 // Generate s e c r e t hash here and send to c l i e n t
234 std : : s t r i n g hash = th i s−>GenerateAuthenticat ionHash ( ) ;
235 th i s−>mPlayerPorts [ hash ] = port ;
236 s f : : Packet authent i ca t i onPacket = th i s−>CreateAuthent icat ionPacket ( hash
) ;
237
238 th i s−>SetAuthent icat ionStatusForHash ( hash , WAITING_FOR_AUTHENTICATION) ;
239 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( authent i cat ionPacket , " 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 " , (
unsigned shor t ) port ) ;
240 }
1 //
2 // GameServer . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f GameServer_hpp
10 #de f i n e GameServer_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <iostream>
14 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
15 #inc lude <thread>
16 #inc lude <chrono>
17 #inc lude "GameManager . hpp "
18 #inc lude " PacketHandler . hpp "
19
20
21 c l a s s GameServer {
22 pub l i c :
23 GameServer ( ) ;
24 void Sta r tSe rve r ( ) ;
25
26 pr i va t e :
27 std : : thread mSocketThread ;
28 const i n t mReceivePort = 5500 ;
29 const i n t mSendPort = 5600 ;
30 bool mIsServerRunning ;
31 s f : : UdpSocket mUdpSocket ;
32 PacketHandler mPacketHandler ;
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33 GameManager mGameManager ;
34
35 void Proces sSocket s ( ) ;
36 void ShowServerControlMenu ( ) ;
37 } ;
38
39 #end i f /∗ GameServer_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // GameServer . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude "GameServer . hpp "
10
11 GameServer : : GameServer ( ) : mPacketHandler ( th i s−>mSendPort , &th i s−>mUdpSocket )




15 void GameServer : : S ta r tSe rve r ( ) {
16 th i s−>mUdpSocket . s e tB lock ing ( f a l s e ) ;
17 i f ( th i s−>mUdpSocket . bind ( th i s−>mReceivePort ) != s f : : Socket : : Done ) {
18 throw std : : runtime_error ( std : : s t r i n g ( " Fa i l ed to bind socket to port
" ) + std : : to_st r ing ( th i s−>mReceivePort ) ) ;
19 }
20
21 // Run the p ro c e s s i ng o f s o cke t s in another thread
22 th i s−>mIsServerRunning = true ;
23 th i s−>mSocketThread = std : : thread(&GameServer : : ProcessSockets , t h i s ) ;
24
25 // Run con t r o l menu in main thread
26 th i s−>ShowServerControlMenu ( ) ;
27 }
28
29 void GameServer : : Proces sSocket s ( ) {
30 whi le ( th i s−>mIsServerRunning ) {
31 std : : th i s_thread : : s l e ep_fo r ( std : : chrono : : m i l l i s e c ond s (1 ) ) ;
32 s f : : Packet packet ;
33 s f : : IpAddress sender ;
34 unsigned shor t port ;
35 s f : : Socket : : Status socke tSta tus = th i s−>mUdpSocket . r e c e i v e ( packet ,
sender , port ) ;
36
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37 i f ( s o cke tS ta tus == s f : : Socket : : Done ) {
38 th i s−>mPacketHandler . HandlePacket ( packet , sender , port ) ;
39 } e l s e i f ( s ocke tSta tus == s f : : Socket : : NotReady ) {
40 // No data







48 void GameServer : : ShowServerControlMenu ( ) {
49 std : : cout << " Server c on t r o l panel " << std : : endl ;
50 std : : cout << " Server i s running on port " << th i s−>mReceivePort << std
: : endl ;
51 std : : cout << std : : endl ;
52
53 std : : s t r i n g input ;
54 whi le ( th i s−>mIsServerRunning ) {
55 std : : th i s_thread : : s l e ep_fo r ( std : : chrono : : m i l l i s e c ond s (100) ) ;
56 }
57
58 std : : cout << " Server shut t ing down" << std : : endl ;
59 th i s−>mSocketThread . j o i n ( ) ;
60 }
1 #inc lude <SFML/Audio . hpp>
2 #inc lude <SFML/Graphics . hpp>
3 #inc lude "GameServer . hpp "
4
5 i n t main ( i n t argc , char const ∗∗ argv )
6 {
7 GameServer gameServer ;
8 gameServer . S ta r tSe rve r ( ) ;
9 re turn 1 ;
10 }
1 //
2 // Match . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 22/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f Match_hpp
10 #de f i n e Match_hpp
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11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <iostream>
14 #inc lude <vector>
15 #inc lude <random>
16 #inc lude " Player . hpp "
17
18 c l a s s Match {
19 pr i va t e :
20 i n t mMatchId ;
21 i n t mCurrentTurnPlayer ;
22 i n t mNumberToGuess ;
23 std : : vector<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> mPlayers ;
24 pub l i c :
25 Match ( i n t matchId , std : : vector<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> p laye r s ) ;
26 Match ( const Match &m2) ;
27 i n t GetMatchId ( ) ;
28 std : : vector<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> GetPlayers ( ) ;
29 std : : shared_ptr<Player> GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( ) ;
30 std : : shared_ptr<Player> GetPlayerWithAddressAndPort ( s f : : IpAddress
address , i n t port ) ;
31 void SetNextTurnPlayer ( ) ;
32 void SetNewNumberToGuess ( ) ;
33 i n t GetNumberToGuess ( ) ;
34 } ;
35
36 #end i f /∗ Match_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // Match . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 22/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude "Match . hpp "
10
11 Match : : Match ( i n t matchId , std : : vector<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> p laye r s ) :
mMatchId (matchId ) , mPlayers ( p l aye r s ) , mCurrentTurnPlayer (0 ) {
12 th i s−>SetNewNumberToGuess ( ) ;
13 }
14
15 Match : : Match ( const Match &m2) {
16 th i s−>mCurrentTurnPlayer = m2. mCurrentTurnPlayer ;
17 th i s−>mMatchId = m2.mMatchId ;




21 std : : shared_ptr<Player> Match : : GetPlayerWithAddressAndPort ( s f : : IpAddress
address , i n t port ) {
22 f o r ( const auto & player : th i s−>mPlayers ) {
23 i f ( p layer−>GetAddress ( ) == address && player−>GetPort ( ) == (
unsigned shor t ) port ) {
24 re turn p laye r ;
25 }
26 }
27 re turn nu l l p t r ;
28 }
29
30 void Match : : SetNewNumberToGuess ( ) {
31 std : : random_device rd ;
32 std : : mt19937_64 gen ( rd ( ) ) ;
33 std : : un i form_int_dis t r ibut ion<> d i s t (1 , 100) ;
34 th i s−>mNumberToGuess = d i s t ( gen ) ;




38 i n t Match : : GetNumberToGuess ( ) {
39 re turn th i s−>mNumberToGuess ;
40 }
41
42 std : : shared_ptr<Player> Match : : GetCurrentTurnPlayer ( ) {
43 re turn th i s−>mPlayers [ th i s−>mCurrentTurnPlayer ] ;
44 }
45
46 void Match : : SetNextTurnPlayer ( ) {
47 i f ( th i s−>mCurrentTurnPlayer == th i s−>mPlayers . s i z e ( ) − 1) {
48 th i s−>mCurrentTurnPlayer = 0 ;
49 } e l s e {




54 i n t Match : : GetMatchId ( ) {
55 re turn th i s−>mMatchId ;
56 }
57
58 std : : vector<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> Match : : GetPlayers ( ) {




2 // MatchMaker . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f MatchMaker_hpp
10 #de f i n e MatchMaker_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <queue>
14 #inc lude "Match . hpp "
15 #inc lude " Player . hpp "
16
17 c l a s s MatchMaker {
18 pr i va t e :
19 Match CreateMatchFromPlayer ( ) ;
20 std : : funct ion<void ( std : : shared_ptr<Match>)> mMatchFoundDelegate ;
21 std : : queue<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> mQueuedPlayers ;
22 i n t mMatchSize ;
23 void TryToMatchMake ( ) ;
24 i n t mMatchId ;
25 pub l i c :
26 MatchMaker ( i n t matchSize , s td : : funct ion<void ( std : : shared_ptr<Match>)>
matchFoundDelegate ) ;
27 void AddPlayer ( std : : shared_ptr<Player> p layer ) ;
28 void RemovePlayer ( Player ∗ p layer ) ;
29 } ;
30
31 #end i f /∗ MatchMaker_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // MatchMaker . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude "MatchMaker . hpp "
10
11 MatchMaker : : MatchMaker ( i n t matchSize , s td : : funct ion<void ( std : : shared_ptr<
Match>)> matchFoundDelegate ) : mMatchSize ( matchSize ) , mMatchFoundDelegate





15 void MatchMaker : : AddPlayer ( std : : shared_ptr<Player> p layer ) {
16 th i s−>mQueuedPlayers . push ( p laye r ) ;
17 th i s−>TryToMatchMake ( ) ;
18 }
19
20 void MatchMaker : : TryToMatchMake ( ) {
21 i f ( th i s−>mQueuedPlayers . s i z e ( ) >= th i s−>mMatchSize ) {
22 // Match found
23 std : : vector<std : : shared_ptr<Player>> p laye r s ;
24 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < th i s−>mMatchSize ; i++) {
25 p l aye r s . push_back ( th i s−>mQueuedPlayers . f r on t ( ) ) ;
26 th i s−>mQueuedPlayers . pop ( ) ;
27 }
28 // Cal l d e l e ga t e with match
29 std : : shared_ptr<Match> match (new Match ( th i s−>mMatchId , p l aye r s ) ) ;
30 th i s−>mMatchId++;





3 // OpCodes . hpp
4 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
5 //
6 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
7 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
8 //
9
10 #i f n d e f OpCodes_hpp
11 #de f i n e OpCodes_hpp
12










23 SERVER_SET_TURN, // Turn changes
24 SERVER_WRONG_NUMBER, // Te l l i f number i s lower or h igher






30 #end i f /∗ OpCodes_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // PacketHandler . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f PacketHandler_hpp
10 #de f i n e PacketHandler_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
14 #inc lude <iostream>
15 #inc lude <unordered_map>
16
17 c l a s s PacketHandler {
18 pub l i c :
19 PacketHandler ( i n t sendPort , s f : : UdpSocket ∗ socke t ) ;
20 s f : : Socket : : Status SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
r e c e i v e r I p , bool encrypt = f a l s e ) ;
21 s f : : Socket : : Status SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , bool encrypt = f a l s e ) ;
22 s f : : Socket : : Status SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
23 void HandlePacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress senderIp , i n t port ) ;
24 void SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : : Packet , s f : :
IpAddress , i n t )> func t i on ) ;
25 void SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : : Packet , s f : :
IpAddress , i n t )>, bool decrypt ) ;
26 void SetRece ivePort ( i n t r e c e i v ePor t ) ;
27 void SetDecryptionKey ( std : : s t r i n g key ) ;
28 void SetEncryptionKeyForAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address , unsigned shor t
port , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
29 void SetSendAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address ) ;
30 s f : : IpAddress GetSendAddress ( ) ;
31 i n t GetReceivePort ( ) ;
32
33 pr i va t e :
34 bool mUseEncryption ;
35 i n t mSendPort ;
36 i n t mReceivePort ;
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37 std : : s t r i n g mCryptoKey ;
38 s f : : IpAddress mSendAddress ;
39 s f : : UdpSocket ∗ mUdpSocket ;
40 std : : unordered_map<int , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : : Packet , s f : : IpAddress ,
i n t )>> mPacketHandlers ;
41 std : : unordered_map<int , bool> mNeedsDecryption ;
42 std : : unordered_map<std : : s t r i ng , std : : s t r i ng> mEncryptionKeys ;
43 std : : s t r i n g CreateAddresStr ing ( s f : : IpAddress address , unsigned shor t
port ) ;
44 s f : : Packet EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) ;
45 s f : : Packet EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
46 s f : : Packet DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
47 s f : : Packet DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) ;
48 } ;
49
50 #end i f /∗ PacketHandler_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // PacketHandler . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " PacketHandler . hpp "
10
11 PacketHandler : : PacketHandler ( i n t sendPort , s f : : UdpSocket ∗ socke t ) :
mSendPort ( sendPort ) , mUdpSocket ( socke t ) , mUseEncryption ( t rue ) {
12 // th i s−>mUseEncryption = f a l s e ;
13 }
14
15 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) {
16 re turn th i s−>EncryptData ( packet , th i s−>mCryptoKey) ;
17 }
18
19 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
20 // I f encrypt ion i s not in use , j u s t re turn the packet as normal
21 i f ( ! th i s−>mUseEncryption ) {
22 re turn packet ;
23 }
24
25 // Extract opcode from the packet
26 s f : : Packet encryptedPacket ;
27
28 i n t opCode ;
29 packet >> opCode ;
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30 encryptedPacket << opCode ;
31
32 // Get data o f the packet in to bu f f e r
33 const char ∗ charBuf f e r = ( char ∗) packet . getData ( )+s i z e o f ( char ) ∗4 ;
34 i n t n = packet . getDataSize ( )−s i z e o f ( char ) ∗4 ;
35
36 // Convert the char ∗ data bu f f e r to std : : vec to r data bu f f e r
37 std : : vector<char> data ( charBuf fer , charBuf f e r + n) ;
38 std : : s i z e_t dataS ize = n ;
39 std : : vector<char> encryptedData ;
40
41 // Encrypt by XOR: ing with encrypt ion key
42 f o r ( std : : s i z e_t i = 0 ; i < dataS ize ; i++) {
43 encryptedData . push_back ( data [ i ] ^ key [ i % key . l ength ( ) ] ) ;
44 }
45
46 // Create the encrypted packet and append the data
47
48 encryptedPacket . append ( encryptedData . data ( ) , dataS i ze ) ;
49 re turn encryptedPacket ;
50 }
51
52 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
53 s f : : Packet decryptedPacket = th i s−>EncryptData ( packet , key ) ;
54 i n t opCode ;
55 decryptedPacket >> opCode ;
56 re turn decryptedPacket ;
57 }
58
59 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) {
60 re turn th i s−>DecryptData ( packet , th i s−>mCryptoKey) ;
61 }
62
63 void PacketHandler : : SetSendAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address ) {
64 th i s−>mSendAddress = address ;
65 }
66
67 s f : : IpAddress PacketHandler : : GetSendAddress ( ) {
68 re turn th i s−>mSendAddress ;
69 }
70
71 void PacketHandler : : SetEncryptionKeyForAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address ,
unsigned shor t port , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
72 std : : s t r i n g s t r ingAddre s s = th i s−>CreateAddresStr ing ( address , port ) ;




76 std : : s t r i n g PacketHandler : : CreateAddresStr ing ( s f : : IpAddress address ,
unsigned shor t port ) {
77 re turn address . t oS t r i ng ( ) + " : " + std : : to_st r ing ( port ) ;
78 }
79
80 s f : : Socket : : Status PacketHandler : : SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
81 packet = th i s−>EncryptData ( packet , key ) ;
82 re turn th i s−>mUdpSocket−>send ( packet , r e c e i v e r I p , r e c e i v e rPo r t ) ;
83 }
84
85 s f : : Socket : : Status PacketHandler : : SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress r e c e i v e r I p , bool encrypt ) {
86 re turn th i s−>SendPacket ( packet , r e c e i v e r I p , th i s−>mSendPort , encrypt ) ;
87 }
88
89 s f : : Socket : : Status PacketHandler : : SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , bool encrypt ) {
90 i f ( encrypt ) {
91 packet = th i s−>EncryptData ( packet ) ;
92 }
93 s f : : Socket : : Status r e s = th i s−>mUdpSocket−>send ( packet , r e c e i v e r I p ,
r e c e i v e rPo r t ) ;
94 re turn r e s ;
95 }
96
97 void PacketHandler : : SetRece ivePort ( i n t r e c e i v ePor t ) {
98 th i s−>mReceivePort = re c e i v ePo r t ;
99 }
100
101 i n t PacketHandler : : GetReceivePort ( ) {
102 re turn th i s−>mReceivePort ;
103 }
104
105 void PacketHandler : : HandlePacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress senderIp ,
i n t port ) {
106 s f : : Packet copyPacket = packet ;
107 i n t opCode = −1;
108 packet >> opCode ;
109
110 i f ( th i s−>mNeedsDecryption [ opCode ] ) {
111 std : : s t r i n g s t r ingAddre s s = th i s−>CreateAddresStr ing ( senderIp , port
) ;
112 i f ( th i s−>mEncryptionKeys . f i nd ( s t r ingAddre s s ) != th i s−>
mEncryptionKeys . end ( ) ) {
113 packet = th i s−>DecryptData ( copyPacket , th i s−>mEncryptionKeys [
s t r ingAddre s s ] ) ;
94
114 } e l s e {




119 i f ( packet ) {
120 // Data ex t r a c t i on s u c c e s f u l l
121 i f ( th i s−>mPacketHandlers . f i nd ( opCode ) != th i s−>mPacketHandlers . end
( ) ) {
122 // Found key
123 th i s−>mPacketHandlers [ opCode ] ( packet , senderIp , port ) ;
124 } e l s e {
125 // Discard the packet with i n v a l i d opcode





131 void PacketHandler : : SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : :
Packet , s f : : IpAddress , i n t )> func t i on ) {
132 th i s−>mNeedsDecryption [ opCode ] = f a l s e ;
133 th i s−>mPacketHandlers [ opCode ] = func t i on ;
134 }
135
136 void PacketHandler : : SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : :
Packet , s f : : IpAddress , i n t )> funct ion , bool decrypt ) {
137 th i s−>mNeedsDecryption [ opCode ] = decrypt ;
138 th i s−>mPacketHandlers [ opCode ] = func t i on ;
139 }
140
141 void PacketHandler : : SetDecryptionKey ( std : : s t r i n g key ) {
142 th i s−>mCryptoKey = key ;
143 }
1 //
2 // Player . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 22/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f Player_hpp
10 #de f i n e Player_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
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14
15 c l a s s Player {
16 pub l i c :
17 Player ( s f : : IpAddress ipAddress , s td : : s t r i n g name , std : : s t r i n g
authent icat ionHash , i n t port ) ;
18 std : : s t r i n g GetName ( ) ;
19 s f : : IpAddress GetAddress ( ) ;
20 unsigned shor t GetPort ( ) ;
21 std : : s t r i n g GetAuthenticationHash ( ) ;
22 pr i va t e :
23 std : : s t r i n g mAuthenticationHash ;
24 s f : : IpAddress mIpAddress ;
25 std : : s t r i n g mName;
26 i n t mPort ;
27 } ;
28
29 #end i f /∗ Player_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // Player . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 22/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " Player . hpp "
10
11 Player : : Player ( s f : : IpAddress ipAddress , s td : : s t r i n g name , std : : s t r i n g
authent icat ionHash , i n t port ) : mIpAddress ( ipAddress ) , mName(name) ,




15 std : : s t r i n g Player : : GetName ( ) {
16 re turn th i s−>mName;
17 }
18
19 s f : : IpAddress Player : : GetAddress ( ) {
20 re turn th i s−>mIpAddress ;
21 }
22
23 unsigned shor t Player : : GetPort ( ) {
24 re turn ( unsigned shor t ) th i s−>mPort ;
25 }
26
27 std : : s t r i n g Player : : GetAuthenticationHash ( ) {
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28 re turn th i s−>mAuthenticationHash ;
29 }
B Guessing game client
1 //
2 // Game . hpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 22/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f Game_hpp
10 #de f i n e Game_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <SFML/Audio . hpp>
14 #inc lude <SFML/Graphics . hpp>
15 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
16 #inc lude <random>
17 #inc lude <thread>
18 #inc lude <chrono>
19 #inc lude " ResourcePath . hpp "
20 #inc lude " . . / . . / Thesis−game−s e r v e r /Thesis−game−s e r v e r /OpCodes . hpp "
21 #inc lude " PacketHandler . hpp "
22 #inc lude " SceneHandler . hpp "
23 #inc lude " InputNameScene . hpp "
24 #inc lude "GameScene . hpp "
25
26 c l a s s Game {
27 pub l i c :
28 Game( ) ;
29 void Run( ) ;
30 pr i va t e :
31 s f : : RenderWindow mGameWindow;
32 PacketHandler mPacketHandler ;
33 s f : : UdpSocket mUdpSocket ;
34 SceneHandler mSceneHandler ;
35
36 i n t mReceivePort ;
37 const i n t mSendPort = 5500 ;
38
39 void Render ( ) ;
40 void Rece ivePackets ( ) ;
41 void RegisterOpCodes ( ) ;
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42 void Reg i s t e rScene s ( ) ;
43 void ReceivedAuthenticat ionHash ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender
, i n t port ) ;
44 } ;
45
46 #end i f /∗ Game_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // Game . cpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 22/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude "Game . hpp "
10
11 Game : : Game( ) :mGameWindow( s f : : VideoMode (800 , 600) , "Number gues s ing game" ) ,
mPacketHandler (5500 , &th i s−>mUdpSocket ) , mSceneHandler ( th i s−>mGameWindow
) {
12 std : : random_device rd ;
13 std : : mt19937_64 gen ( rd ( ) ) ;
14 std : : un i form_int_dis t r ibut ion<> d i s t (6000 , 7000) ;
15
16 th i s−>mReceivePort = d i s t ( gen ) ;
17 th i s−>mPacketHandler . SetRece ivePort ( th i s−>mReceivePort ) ;
18 th i s−>mPacketHandler . SetSendAddress ( " 1 2 7 . 0 . 0 . 1 " ) ;
19 th i s−>mUdpSocket . bind ( th i s−>mReceivePort ) ;
20 th i s−>mUdpSocket . s e tB lock ing ( f a l s e ) ;
21 th i s−>RegisterOpCodes ( ) ;
22 th i s−>Reg i s t e rScene s ( ) ;
23 th i s−>mSceneHandler . Se tVar iab l e ( " isRunning " , "YES" ) ;
24 }
25
26 void Game : : Render ( ) {
27 th i s−>mSceneHandler . DrawCurrentScene ( ) ;
28 }
29
30 void Game : : Reg i s t e rScene s ( ) {
31 th i s−>mSceneHandler . Reg i s t e rScene (1 , new InputNameScene(&th i s−>
mSceneHandler , &th i s−>mPacketHandler ) ) ;
32 th i s−>mSceneHandler . Reg i s t e rScene (2 , new GameScene(&th i s−>mSceneHandler
, &th i s−>mPacketHandler ) ) ;
33




37 void Game : : RegisterOpCodes ( ) {
38 us ing namespace std : : p l a c eho l d e r s ;
39 th i s−>mPacketHandler . SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :
SERVER_GIVE_AUTHENTICATION_HASH, std : : bind(&Game : :
ReceivedAuthenticat ionHash , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) ) ;
40 }
41
42 void Game : : ReceivedAuthenticat ionHash ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
43 std : : s t r i n g hash ;
44 packet >> hash ;
45 std : : cout << hash ;
46 th i s−>mSceneHandler . Se tVar iab l e ( "HASH" , hash ) ;
47 }
48
49 void Game : : Rece ivePackets ( ) {
50 s f : : Packet packet ;
51 s f : : IpAddress sender ;
52 unsigned shor t port ;
53 s f : : Socket : : Status socke tSta tus = th i s−>mUdpSocket . r e c e i v e ( packet ,
sender , port ) ;
54
55 i f ( s o cke tS ta tus == s f : : Socket : : Done ) {
56 std : : cout << " Received packet " << std : : endl ;
57 th i s−>mPacketHandler . HandlePacket ( packet , sender , port ) ;
58 } e l s e i f ( s ocke tSta tus == s f : : Socket : : NotReady ) {
59 // No data
60 } e l s e {
61 // Error




66 void Game : : Run( ) {
67
68 // Set the Icon
69 s f : : Image i con ;
70 i f ( ! i con . loadFromFile ( resourcePath ( ) + " i con . png " ) ) {
71 re turn EXIT_FAILURE;
72 }
73 th i s−>mGameWindow. s e t I c on ( i con . g e tS i z e ( ) . x , i con . g e tS i z e ( ) . y , i con .
g e tP ix e l sP t r ( ) ) ;
74
75
76 whi le ( th i s−>mGameWindow. isOpen ( ) && th i s−>mSceneHandler . GetVariable ( "
isRunning " ) == "YES" )
77 {
99
78 std : : th i s_thread : : s l e ep_fo r ( std : : chrono : : m i l l i s e c ond s (50) ) ;
79 th i s−>ReceivePackets ( ) ;




2 // GameScene . hpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f GameScene_hpp
10 #de f i n e GameScene_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude " Scene . hpp "
14








23 c l a s s GameScene : pub l i c Scene {
24 pub l i c :
25 v i r t u a l i n t Run ( s f : : RenderWindow & window) ;
26 GameScene ( SceneHandler ∗ sceneHandler , PacketHandler ∗packetHandler ) ;
27
28 void ReceiveMatchStartPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender ,
i n t port ) ;
29 void ReceiveSetTurnMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender , i n t
port ) ;
30 void ReceiveWrongGuessMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender ,
i n t port ) ;
31 void ReceiveCorrectGuessMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender
, i n t port ) ;
32 void ReceiveNewRoundMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender ,
i n t port ) ;
33
34 pr i va t e :
35 s f : : Font mFont ;
36 s f : : Text mPlayer1Text ;
100
37 s f : : Text mPlayer2Text ;
38 s f : : Text mPlayer3Text ;
39 s f : : Text mInfoText ;
40 std : : s t r i n g mPlayer1Name ;
41 std : : s t r i n g mPlayer2Name ;
42 std : : s t r i n g mPlayer3Name ;
43 std : : s t r i n g mGameStateInfo ;
44
45 s f : : Text mGuessNumberTitleText ;
46
47 s f : : RectangleShape mGuessNumberBox ;
48 s f : : Text mGuessNumberText ;
49 s f : : S t r ing mGuessNumber ;
50
51 InputAction GetTextInput ( s f : : Event event ) ;
52
53
54 i n t mMatchId ;
55 i n t mNumberToGuess ;
56 TurnType mTurnType ;
57
58 void Draw( s f : : RenderWindow &window) ;
59 void SetSelectNumberToGuess ( ) ;
60 void SetGuessNumber ( ) ;
61 void SetWaitForOtherToSelectNumber ( ) ;
62 void SetTurnForPlayerWithName ( std : : s t r i n g name) ;
63 void SendGuessToServer ( i n t guess ) ;
64 void SetWaitingForOtherPlayersGuess ( ) ;
65 void SetYourTimeToGuess ( ) ;
66 } ;
67
68 #end i f /∗ GameScene_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // GameScene . cpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude "GameScene . hpp "
10
11 GameScene : : GameScene ( SceneHandler ∗ sceneHandler , PacketHandler ∗
packetHandler ) : Scene ( sceneHandler , packetHandler ) {
12 th i s−>mTurnType = TURN_UNDEFINED;
13
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14 i f ( th i s−>mFont . loadFromFile ( resourcePath ( ) + " sansa t i on . t t f " ) )
15 {
16 // e r r o r . . .
17 }
18
19 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
20 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . s e t S t r i n g ( "Waiting f o r other p laye r ’ s guess
" ) ;
21 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
22
23 th i s−>mGameStateInfo = " " ;
24 th i s−>mInfoText . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
25 th i s−>mInfoText . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
26 th i s−>mInfoText . s e t S t r i n g ( th i s−>mGameStateInfo ) ;
27
28 th i s−>mPlayer1Text . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
29 th i s−>mPlayer2Text . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
30 th i s−>mPlayer3Text . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
31 th i s−>mPlayer1Text . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
32 th i s−>mPlayer2Text . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
33 th i s−>mPlayer3Text . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
34
35 th i s−>mGuessNumberBox . s e t S i z e ( s f : : Vector2 f (450 , 80) ) ;
36 th i s−>mGuessNumberBox . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : Magenta ) ;
37
38 th i s−>mGuessNumberText . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
39 th i s−>mGuessNumberText . s e tCharac t e rS i z e (50) ;
40 th i s−>mGuessNumberText . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : Black ) ;
41
42 us ing namespace std : : p l a c eho l d e r s ;
43
44 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :SERVER_MATCH_STARTED,
std : : bind(&GameScene : : ReceiveMatchStartPacket , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) , t rue ) ;
45 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :SERVER_SET_TURN, std : :
bind(&GameScene : : ReceiveSetTurnMessage , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) , t rue ) ;
46 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :SERVER_WRONG_NUMBER,
std : : bind(&GameScene : : ReceiveWrongGuessMessage , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) , t rue )
;
47 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :SERVER_CORRECT_NUMBER,
std : : bind(&GameScene : : ReceiveCorrectGuessMessage , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) ,
t rue ) ;
48 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :SERVER_NEW_ROUND, std
: : bind(&GameScene : : ReceiveNewRoundMessage , th i s , _1 , _2 , _3) , t rue ) ;
49 }
50





55 void GameScene : : ReceiveNewRoundMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
56 packet >> th i s−>mNumberToGuess ;
57 bool isYou ;
58 packet >> isYou ;
59 i f ( isYou ) {
60 th i s−>SetYourTimeToGuess ( ) ;
61 } e l s e {




66 void GameScene : : ReceiveWrongGuessMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
67 i n t d i r e c t i o n ;
68 i n t guessedNumber ;
69 packet >> guessedNumber ;
70 packet >> d i r e c t i o n ;
71 i f ( d i r e c t i o n == −1) {
72 th i s−>mGameStateInfo = "The guessed number " + std : : to_st r ing (
guessedNumber ) + " was too low ! " ;
73 } e l s e i f ( d i r e c t i o n == 1) {
74 th i s−>mGameStateInfo = "The guessed number " + std : : to_st r ing (
guessedNumber ) + " was too high ! " ;
75 } e l s e {
76 th i s−>mGameStateInfo = "The guessed number " + std : : to_st r ing (
guessedNumber ) + " was c o r r e c t ! " ;
77 }
78 th i s−>mInfoText . s e t S t r i n g ( th i s−>mGameStateInfo ) ;
79 }
80
81 void GameScene : : ReceiveSetTurnMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
82 std : : s t r i n g userTurn ;
83 bool isYou ;
84 packet >> userTurn ;
85 packet >> isYou ;
86 i f ( isYou ) {
87 th i s−>SetYourTimeToGuess ( ) ;
88 } e l s e {




93 void GameScene : : ReceiveCorrectGuessMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
103
sender , i n t port ) {
94 // Close the game
95 th i s−>mSceneHandler−>SetVar iab l e ( " isRunning " , "NO" ) ;
96 }
97
98 void GameScene : : Draw( s f : : RenderWindow &window) {
99
100 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText .
getLocalBounds ( ) . l e f t /2 .0 f , th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . getLocalBounds ( )
. top /2 .0 f ) ;
101 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . s e tPo s i t i o n (290 ,230) ;
102
103 th i s−>mGuessNumberText . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mGuessNumberText . getLocalBounds
( ) . l e f t /2 .0 f , th i s−>mGuessNumberText . getLocalBounds ( ) . top /2 .0 f ) ;
104 th i s−>mPlayer1Text . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mPlayer1Text . getLocalBounds ( ) . l e f t
/2 .0 f , th i s−>mPlayer1Text . getLocalBounds ( ) . top /2 .0 f ) ;
105 th i s−>mPlayer2Text . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mPlayer2Text . getLocalBounds ( ) . l e f t
/2 .0 f , th i s−>mPlayer2Text . getLocalBounds ( ) . top /2 .0 f ) ;
106 th i s−>mPlayer3Text . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mPlayer3Text . getLocalBounds ( ) . l e f t
/2 .0 f , th i s−>mPlayer3Text . getLocalBounds ( ) . top /2 .0 f ) ;
107 th i s−>mGuessNumberText . s e tPo s i t i o n (190 ,290) ;
108
109 // Input box
110 th i s−>mGuessNumberBox . s e tPo s i t i o n (180 , 280) ;
111
112 th i s−>mPlayer1Text . s e tPo s i t i o n (150 , 100) ;
113 th i s−>mPlayer2Text . s e tPo s i t i o n (350 , 100) ;
114 th i s−>mPlayer3Text . s e tPo s i t i o n (550 , 100) ;
115
116 th i s−>mInfoText . s e tPo s i t i o n (150 , 500) ;
117
118 window . draw ( th i s−>mGuessNumberBox) ;
119 window . draw ( th i s−>mGuessNumberText ) ;
120
121 window . draw ( th i s−>mPlayer1Text ) ;
122 window . draw ( th i s−>mPlayer2Text ) ;
123 window . draw ( th i s−>mPlayer3Text ) ;
124
125 window . draw ( th i s−>mInfoText ) ;
126 }
127
128 InputAction GameScene : : GetTextInput ( s f : : Event event ) {
129 i f ( event . type == s f : : Event : : TextEntered && th i s−>mTurnType ==
TURN_YOU_GUESS_NUMBER) {
130 i f ( event . t ex t . unicode == ’ \b ’ ) {
131 i f ( th i s−>mGuessNumber . g e tS i z e ( ) > 0) {




134 } e l s e i f ( event . t ex t . unicode == ’ \n ’ ) {
135 re turn InputAction : : INPUT_SUBMIT_GUESS;
136 } e l s e {
137 i f ( th i s−>mGuessNumber . g e tS i z e ( ) <= 10 && event . t ex t . unicode <
128 ) {
138 mGuessNumber += event . t ex t . unicode ;
139 }
140 }
141 mGuessNumberText . s e t S t r i n g (mGuessNumber) ;
142 }
143 re turn InputAction : : INPUT_NO_ACTION;
144 }
145
146 void GameScene : : ReceiveMatchStartPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender , i n t port ) {
147 packet >> th i s−>mMatchId ;
148 packet >> th i s−>mNumberToGuess ;
149 std : : s t r i n g numberSelectorName ;
150 packet >> numberSelectorName ;
151 packet >> th i s−>mPlayer1Name ;
152 packet >> th i s−>mPlayer2Name ;
153 packet >> th i s−>mPlayer3Name ;
154
155 th i s−>mPlayer1Text . s e t S t r i n g ( th i s−>mPlayer1Name ) ;
156 th i s−>mPlayer2Text . s e t S t r i n g ( th i s−>mPlayer2Name ) ;
157 th i s−>mPlayer3Text . s e t S t r i n g ( th i s−>mPlayer3Name ) ;
158
159 bool yourTurn ;
160 packet >> yourTurn ;
161 i f ( yourTurn ) {
162 th i s−>SetYourTimeToGuess ( ) ;
163 }
164 th i s−>mSceneHandler−>SetScene (2 ) ;
165 }
166
167 void GameScene : : SendGuessToServer ( i n t guess ) {
168 s f : : Packet packet = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes : :
USER_GUESS_NUMBER, true ) ;
169 packet << th i s−>mMatchId ;
170 packet << guess ;
171 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packet , th i s−>mPacketHandler−>
GetSendAddress ( ) , t rue ) ;
172 }
173
174 i n t GameScene : : Run( s f : : RenderWindow &window) {
105
175 s f : : Event Event ;
176
177 whi le (window . po l lEvent ( Event ) )
178 {
179 InputAction ac t i on = th i s−>GetTextInput ( Event ) ;
180 i f ( a c t i on == InputAction : : INPUT_SUBMIT_GUESS) {
181 // Send guess to s e r v e r
182 t ry {
183 i n t number = std : : s t o i ( th i s−>mGuessNumber . toAns iSt r ing
( ) ) ;
184 th i s−>SendGuessToServer (number ) ;
185 } catch ( std : : except ion &except ion ) {
186 // e r r o r





192 window . c l e a r ( s f : : Color : : Black ) ;
193 th i s−>Draw(window) ;
194 window . d i sp l ay ( ) ;
195 }
196
197 void GameScene : : SetYourTimeToGuess ( ) {
198 th i s−>mTurnType = TURN_YOU_GUESS_NUMBER;
199 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . s e t S t r i n g ( "Your turn to guess " ) ;
200 th i s−>mGuessNumberBox . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
201 th i s−>mPlayer1Text . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : Blue ) ;
202 }
203
204 void GameScene : : SetWaitingForOtherPlayersGuess ( ) {
205 th i s−>mTurnType = TURN_OTHER_PLAYER_GUESS_NUMBER;
206 th i s−>mGuessNumber = " " ;
207 th i s−>mGuessNumberTitleText . s e t S t r i n g ( "Waiting f o r other p laye r ’ s guess
" ) ;
208 th i s−>mGuessNumberBox . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : Magenta ) ;
209 }
1 //
2 // InputNameScene . hpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f InputNameScene_hpp
106
10 #de f i n e InputNameScene_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude " Scene . hpp "
14 #inc lude " . . / . . / Thesis−game−s e r v e r /Thesis−game−s e r v e r /OpCodes . hpp "
15 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
16 #inc lude <func t i ona l >




21 c l a s s InputNameScene : pub l i c Scene {
22 pr i va t e :
23 void Ver i fyGameIntegr i ty ( ) ;
24 void DrawInputNameBox( s f : : RenderWindow &window) ;
25 void RequestAuthent icat ion ( std : : s t r i n g name) ;
26 InputAction GetTextInput ( s f : : Event event ) ;
27 s f : : Font mFont ;
28 s f : : Text mInputTitleText ;
29 s f : : Text mInputText ;
30 s f : : S t r ing mPlayerNameText ;
31 s f : : RectangleShape mInputBox ;
32
33 pub l i c :
34 InputNameScene ( SceneHandler ∗ sceneHandler , PacketHandler ∗packetHandler
) ;
35 v i r t u a l i n t Run( s f : : RenderWindow &window) ;
36 void JoinMatchMaking ( std : : s t r i n g hash ) ;
37 void ReceiveAuthent icat ionHash ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender )
;
38 void ReceiveMatchFoundMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress sender ) ;
39 void ReceiveGameIntegrityMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
sender ) ;
40 void SendAuthent icatedStatus ( std : : s t r i n g hash ) ;
41 } ;
42
43 #end i f /∗ InputNameScene_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // InputNameScene . cpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " InputNameScene . hpp "
107
10
11 InputNameScene : : InputNameScene ( SceneHandler ∗ sceneHandler , PacketHandler ∗
packetHandler ) : Scene ( sceneHandler , packetHandler ) {
12 i f ( th i s−>mFont . loadFromFile ( resourcePath ( ) + " sansa t i on . t t f " ) )
13 {
14 // e r r o r . . .
15 }
16 th i s−>mInputTitleText . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
17 th i s−>mInputTitleText . s e t S t r i n g ( " Enter your name : " ) ;
18 th i s−>mInputTitleText . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
19
20 th i s−>mInputBox . s e t S i z e ( s f : : Vector2 f (450 , 80) ) ;
21 th i s−>mInputBox . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : White ) ;
22
23 th i s−>mInputText . setFont ( th i s−>mFont) ;
24 th i s−>mInputText . s e tCharac t e rS i z e (50) ;
25 th i s−>mInputText . s e t S t r i n g ( " " ) ;
26 th i s−>mInputText . s e t F i l l C o l o r ( s f : : Color : : Black ) ;
27
28 // Subscr ibe opcodes
29 us ing namespace std : : p l a c eho l d e r s ;
30 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :
SERVER_GIVE_AUTHENTICATION_HASH, std : : bind(&InputNameScene : :
ReceiveAuthenticat ionHash , th i s , _1 , _2) ) ;
31 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SubscribeToOpCode (OpCodes : :
SERVER_CONFIRM_GAME_INTEGRITY, std : : bind(&InputNameScene : :
ReceiveGameIntegrityMessage , th i s , _1 , _2) ) ;
32 }
33
34 void InputNameScene : : ReceiveGameIntegrityMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress sender ) {
35 th i s−>RequestAuthent icat ion ( th i s−>mPlayerNameText ) ;
36 }
37
38 void InputNameScene : : Ver i fyGameIntegr i ty ( ) {
39 t ry {
40 std : : i f s t r e am in ( getPathForResource ( ) , s td : : i o s : : in | s td : : i o s : :
b inary ) ;
41
42 std : : i f s t r e am : : pos_type pos = in . t e l l g ( ) ;
43 std : : vector<char> bu f f e r ( pos ) ;
44 in . seekg (0 , std : : i o s : : beg ) ;
45 in . read(&bu f f e r [ 0 ] , pos ) ;
46
47 std : : hash<char∗> hash ;
48 s i z e_t resu l tHash = hash ( bu f f e r . data ( ) ) ;
49 std : : cout << resu l tHash ;
108
50
51 s f : : Packet gameIntegr i tyPacket = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (
OpCodes : :USER_SEND_FILE_HASH) ;
52 std : : s t r i n g hashAsStr ing = std : : to_st r ing ( resu l tHash ) ;
53 gameIntegr i tyPacket << hashAsStr ing ;
54 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( gameIntegr ityPacket , th i s−>
mPacketHandler−>GetSendAddress ( ) ) ;
55
56 } catch ( std : : except ion &e ) {




61 void InputNameScene : : ReceiveMatchFoundMessage ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :




65 void InputNameScene : : SendAuthent icatedStatus ( std : : s t r i n g hash ) {
66 s f : : Packet packet ;
67 packet << OpCodes : :USER_AUTHENTICATED;
68 packet << hash ;
69 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packet , th i s−>mPacketHandler−>
GetSendAddress ( ) ) ;
70 }
71
72 void InputNameScene : : JoinMatchMaking ( std : : s t r i n g hash ) {
73 s f : : Packet packet ;
74 packet << OpCodes : :USER_MATCHMAKING_ENTER_QUEUE;
75 packet << hash ;
76 packet << th i s−>mPlayerNameText . toAns iSt r ing ( ) ;
77 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packet , th i s−>mPacketHandler−>




81 void InputNameScene : : Rece iveAuthent icat ionHash ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress sender ) {
82 std : : s t r i n g hash ;
83 packet >> hash ;
84 std : : cout << " Received hash : " ;
85 std : : cout << hash ;
86
87 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SetDecryptionKey ( hash ) ;
88 th i s−>SendAuthent icatedStatus ( hash ) ;
89 th i s−>mSceneHandler−>SetVar iab l e ( "HASH" , hash ) ;




93 void InputNameScene : : DrawInputNameBox( s f : : RenderWindow &window) {
94
95 // Header t ext
96 th i s−>mInputTitleText . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mInputTitleText . getLocalBounds ( ) .
l e f t /2 .0 f , th i s−>mInputTitleText . getLocalBounds ( ) . top /2 .0 f ) ;
97 th i s−>mInputTitleText . s e tPo s i t i o n (290 ,230) ;
98
99 th i s−>mInputText . s e tOr i g i n ( th i s−>mInputTitleText . getLocalBounds ( ) . l e f t
/2 .0 f , th i s−>mInputTitleText . getLocalBounds ( ) . top /2 .0 f ) ;
100 th i s−>mInputText . s e tPo s i t i o n (190 ,290) ;
101
102 // Input box
103 th i s−>mInputBox . s e tPo s i t i o n (180 , 280) ;
104
105 window . draw ( th i s−>mInputTitleText ) ;
106 window . draw ( th i s−>mInputBox ) ;
107 window . draw ( th i s−>mInputText ) ;
108 }
109
110 InputAction InputNameScene : : GetTextInput ( s f : : Event event ) {
111 i f ( event . type == s f : : Event : : TextEntered ) {
112 i f ( event . t ex t . unicode == ’ \b ’ ) {
113 i f ( th i s−>mPlayerNameText . g e tS i z e ( ) > 0) {
114 th i s−>mPlayerNameText . e r a s e ( th i s−>mPlayerNameText . g e tS i z e ( )
− 1 , 1) ;
115 }
116 } e l s e i f ( event . t ex t . unicode == ’ \n ’ ) {
117 re turn InputAction : : INPUT_SUBMIT_NAME;
118 } e l s e {
119 i f ( th i s−>mPlayerNameText . g e tS i z e ( ) <= 10 && event . t ex t . unicode
< 128 ) {
120 mPlayerNameText += event . t ex t . unicode ;
121 }
122 }
123 mInputText . s e t S t r i n g (mPlayerNameText ) ;
124 }
125 re turn InputAction : : INPUT_NO_ACTION;
126 }
127
128 void InputNameScene : : RequestAuthent icat ion ( std : : s t r i n g name) {
129 s f : : Packet packet = th i s−>CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes : :
USER_REQUEST_AUTHENTICATION_HASH) ;
130 th i s−>mPacketHandler−>SendPacket ( packet , th i s−>mPacketHandler−>





134 i n t InputNameScene : : Run( s f : : RenderWindow &window) {
135 s f : : Event Event ;
136
137 whi le (window . po l lEvent ( Event ) )
138 {
139 InputAction ac t i on = th i s−>GetTextInput ( Event ) ;
140 i f ( a c t i on == InputAction : : INPUT_SUBMIT_NAME) {




145 window . c l e a r ( s f : : Color (255 ,123 ,1 ,0 ) ) ;
146 th i s−>DrawInputNameBox(window) ;




3 // Disc la imer :
4 // −−−−−−−−−−
5 //
6 // This code w i l l work only i f you s e l e c t e d window , g raph i c s and audio .
7 //
8 // Note that the "Run Sc r i p t " bu i ld phase w i l l copy the r equ i r ed frameworks
9 // or dy l i b s to your app l i c a t i o n bundle so you can execute i t on any OS X
10 // computer .
11 //
12 // Your r e sou r c e f i l e s ( images , sounds , fonts , . . . ) are a l s o copied to your
13 // app l i c a t i o n bundle . To get the path to these r e source s , use the he lpe r
14 // func t i on ‘ resourcePath ( ) ‘ from ResourcePath . hpp
15 //
16
17 #inc lude <SFML/Audio . hpp>
18 #inc lude <SFML/Graphics . hpp>
19 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
20 #inc lude " ResourcePath . hpp "
21 #inc lude " . . / . . / Thesis−game−s e r v e r /Thesis−game−s e r v e r /OpCodes . hpp "
22 #inc lude "Game . hpp "
23
24 i n t main ( int , char const ∗∗)
25 {
26 Game game ;
27 game .Run( ) ;
28




2 // PacketHandler . hpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f PacketHandler_hpp
10 #de f i n e PacketHandler_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <SFML/Network . hpp>
14 #inc lude <iostream>
15 #inc lude <unordered_map>
16
17 c l a s s PacketHandler {
18 pub l i c :
19 PacketHandler ( i n t sendPort , s f : : UdpSocket ∗ socke t ) ;
20 s f : : Socket : : Status SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
r e c e i v e r I p , bool encrypt = f a l s e ) ;
21 s f : : Socket : : Status SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , bool encrypt = f a l s e ) ;
22 s f : : Socket : : Status SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress
r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
23 void HandlePacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress senderIp , i n t port ) ;
24 void SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : : Packet , s f : :
IpAddress , i n t )> func t i on ) ;
25 void SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : : Packet , s f : :
IpAddress , i n t )>, bool decrypt ) ;
26 void SetRece ivePort ( i n t r e c e i v ePor t ) ;
27 void SetDecryptionKey ( std : : s t r i n g key ) ;
28 void SetEncryptionKeyForAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address , unsigned shor t
port , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
29 void SetSendAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address ) ;
30 s f : : IpAddress GetSendAddress ( ) ;
31 i n t GetReceivePort ( ) ;
32
33 pr i va t e :
34 bool mUseEncryption ;
35 i n t mSendPort ;
36 i n t mReceivePort ;
37 std : : s t r i n g mCryptoKey ;
38 s f : : IpAddress mSendAddress ;
39 s f : : UdpSocket ∗ mUdpSocket ;
112
40 std : : unordered_map<int , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : : Packet , s f : : IpAddress ,
i n t )>> mPacketHandlers ;
41 std : : unordered_map<int , bool> mNeedsDecryption ;
42 std : : unordered_map<std : : s t r i ng , std : : s t r i ng> mEncryptionKeys ;
43 std : : s t r i n g CreateAddresStr ing ( s f : : IpAddress address , unsigned shor t
port ) ;
44 s f : : Packet EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) ;
45 s f : : Packet EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
46 s f : : Packet DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) ;
47 s f : : Packet DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) ;
48 } ;
49
50 #end i f /∗ PacketHandler_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // PacketHandler . cpp
3 // Thesis−game−s e r v e r
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 21/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " PacketHandler . hpp "
10
11 PacketHandler : : PacketHandler ( i n t sendPort , s f : : UdpSocket ∗ socke t ) :
mSendPort ( sendPort ) , mUdpSocket ( socke t ) , mUseEncryption ( t rue ) {
12 // th i s−>mUseEncryption = f a l s e ;
13 }
14
15 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) {
16 re turn th i s−>EncryptData ( packet , th i s−>mCryptoKey) ;
17 }
18
19 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : EncryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
20 // I f encrypt ion i s not in use , j u s t re turn the packet as normal
21 i f ( ! th i s−>mUseEncryption ) {
22 re turn packet ;
23 }
24 // Extract opcode from the packet
25 s f : : Packet encryptedPacket ;
26
27 i n t opCode ;
28 packet >> opCode ;
29 encryptedPacket << opCode ;
30
31 // Get data o f the packet in to bu f f e r
32 const char ∗ charBuf f e r = ( char ∗) packet . getData ( )+s i z e o f ( char ) ∗4 ;
113
33 i n t n = packet . getDataSize ( )−s i z e o f ( char ) ∗4 ;
34
35 // Convert the char ∗ data bu f f e r to std : : vec to r data bu f f e r
36 std : : vector<char> data ( charBuf fer , charBuf f e r + n) ;
37 std : : s i z e_t dataS ize = n ;
38 std : : vector<char> encryptedData ;
39
40 // Encrypt by XOR: ing with encrypt ion key
41 f o r ( std : : s i z e_t i = 0 ; i < dataS ize ; i++) {
42 encryptedData . push_back ( data [ i ] ^ key [ i % key . l ength ( ) ] ) ;
43 }
44
45 // Create the encrypted packet and append the data
46
47 encryptedPacket . append ( encryptedData . data ( ) , dataS i ze ) ;
48 re turn encryptedPacket ;
49 }
50
51 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
52 s f : : Packet decryptedPacket = th i s−>EncryptData ( packet , key ) ;
53 i n t opCode ;
54 decryptedPacket >> opCode ;
55 re turn decryptedPacket ;
56 }
57
58 s f : : Packet PacketHandler : : DecryptData ( s f : : Packet packet ) {
59 re turn th i s−>DecryptData ( packet , th i s−>mCryptoKey) ;
60 }
61
62 void PacketHandler : : SetSendAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address ) {
63 th i s−>mSendAddress = address ;
64 }
65
66 s f : : IpAddress PacketHandler : : GetSendAddress ( ) {
67 re turn th i s−>mSendAddress ;
68 }
69
70 void PacketHandler : : SetEncryptionKeyForAddress ( s f : : IpAddress address ,
unsigned shor t port , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
71 std : : s t r i n g s t r ingAddre s s = th i s−>CreateAddresStr ing ( address , port ) ;
72 th i s−>mEncryptionKeys [ s t r ingAddre s s ] = key ;
73 }
74
75 std : : s t r i n g PacketHandler : : CreateAddresStr ing ( s f : : IpAddress address ,
unsigned shor t port ) {




79 s f : : Socket : : Status PacketHandler : : SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , s td : : s t r i n g key ) {
80 packet = th i s−>EncryptData ( packet , key ) ;
81 re turn th i s−>mUdpSocket−>send ( packet , r e c e i v e r I p , r e c e i v e rPo r t ) ;
82 }
83
84 s f : : Socket : : Status PacketHandler : : SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress r e c e i v e r I p , bool encrypt ) {
85 re turn th i s−>SendPacket ( packet , r e c e i v e r I p , th i s−>mSendPort , encrypt ) ;
86 }
87
88 s f : : Socket : : Status PacketHandler : : SendPacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : :
IpAddress r e c e i v e r I p , unsigned shor t r e c e i v e rPor t , bool encrypt ) {
89 i f ( encrypt ) {
90 packet = th i s−>EncryptData ( packet ) ;
91 }
92 s f : : Socket : : Status r e s = th i s−>mUdpSocket−>send ( packet , r e c e i v e r I p ,
r e c e i v e rPo r t ) ;
93 re turn r e s ;
94 }
95
96 void PacketHandler : : SetRece ivePort ( i n t r e c e i v ePor t ) {
97 th i s−>mReceivePort = re c e i v ePo r t ;
98 }
99
100 i n t PacketHandler : : GetReceivePort ( ) {
101 re turn th i s−>mReceivePort ;
102 }
103
104 void PacketHandler : : HandlePacket ( s f : : Packet packet , s f : : IpAddress senderIp ,
i n t port ) {
105 s f : : Packet copyPacket = packet ;
106 i n t opCode = −1;
107 packet >> opCode ;
108
109 i f ( th i s−>mNeedsDecryption [ opCode ] ) {
110 std : : s t r i n g s t r ingAddre s s = th i s−>CreateAddresStr ing ( senderIp , port
) ;
111 i f ( th i s−>mEncryptionKeys . f i nd ( s t r ingAddre s s ) != th i s−>
mEncryptionKeys . end ( ) ) {
112 packet = th i s−>DecryptData ( copyPacket , th i s−>mEncryptionKeys [
s t r ingAddre s s ] ) ;
113 } e l s e {





118 i f ( packet ) {
119 // Data ex t r a c t i on s u c c e s f u l l
120 i f ( th i s−>mPacketHandlers . f i nd ( opCode ) != th i s−>mPacketHandlers . end
( ) ) {
121 // Found key
122 th i s−>mPacketHandlers [ opCode ] ( packet , senderIp , port ) ;
123 } e l s e {





129 void PacketHandler : : SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : :
Packet , s f : : IpAddress , i n t )> func t i on ) {
130 th i s−>mNeedsDecryption [ opCode ] = f a l s e ;
131 th i s−>mPacketHandlers [ opCode ] = func t i on ;
132 }
133
134 void PacketHandler : : SubscribeToOpCode ( i n t opCode , std : : funct ion<void ( s f : :
Packet , s f : : IpAddress , i n t )> funct ion , bool decrypt ) {
135 th i s−>mNeedsDecryption [ opCode ] = decrypt ;
136 th i s−>mPacketHandlers [ opCode ] = func t i on ;
137 }
138
139 void PacketHandler : : SetDecryptionKey ( std : : s t r i n g key ) {
140 th i s−>mCryptoKey = key ;
141 }
1 //
2 // Player . hpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f Player_hpp
10 #de f i n e Player_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <iostream>
14
15 c l a s s Player {
16 Player ( std : : s t r i n g name) ;
17 pr i va t e :




21 #end i f /∗ Player_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // Player . cpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " Player . hpp "
10





3 // SFML − Simple and Fast Multimedia Library
4 // Copyright (C) 2007−2018 Marco Antognini ( antogn in i . marco@gmail . com) ,
5 // Laurent Gomila ( laurent@sfml−dev . org )
6 //
7 // This so f tware i s provided ’ as− i s ’ , without any expre s s or impl i ed
warranty .
8 // In no event w i l l the authors be held l i a b l e f o r any damages a r i s i n g from
the use o f t h i s so f tware .
9 //
10 // Permiss ion i s granted to anyone to use t h i s so f tware f o r any purpose ,
11 // in c l ud ing commercial app l i c a t i on s , and to a l t e r i t and r e d i s t r i b u t e i t
f r e e l y ,
12 // sub j e c t to the f o l l ow i ng r e s t r i c t i o n s :
13 //
14 // 1 . The o r i g i n o f t h i s so f tware must not be mis repre sented ;
15 // you must not c la im that you wrote the o r i g i n a l so f tware .
16 // I f you use t h i s so f tware in a product , an acknowledgment
17 // in the product documentation would be apprec ia ted but i s not r equ i r ed
.
18 //
19 // 2 . Altered source v e r s i on s must be p l a i n l y marked as such ,
20 // and must not be mis represented as being the o r i g i n a l so f tware .
21 //
22 // 3 . This no t i c e may not be removed or a l t e r e d from any source





26 #i f n d e f RESOURCE_PATH_HPP





32 #inc lude <s t r i ng>
33
34 // //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
35 /// \ b r i e f Return the path to the r e sou r c e f o l d e r .
36 ///
37 /// \ return The path to the r e sou r c e f o l d e r a s s o c i a t e
38 /// with the main bundle or an empty s t r i n g i s the re i s no bundle .
39 ///
40 // //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
41 std : : s t r i n g resourcePath ( void ) ;
42 std : : s t r i n g currentPath ( void ) ;
43 std : : s t r i n g getPathForResource ( void ) ;
44
45 #end i f
1 // //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
2 //
3 // SFML − Simple and Fast Multimedia Library
4 // Copyright (C) 2007−2018 Marco Antognini ( antogn in i . marco@gmail . com) ,
5 // Laurent Gomila ( laurent@sfml−dev . org )
6 //
7 // This so f tware i s provided ’ as− i s ’ , without any expre s s or impl i ed
warranty .
8 // In no event w i l l the authors be held l i a b l e f o r any damages a r i s i n g from
the use o f t h i s so f tware .
9 //
10 // Permiss ion i s granted to anyone to use t h i s so f tware f o r any purpose ,
11 // in c l ud ing commercial app l i c a t i on s , and to a l t e r i t and r e d i s t r i b u t e i t
f r e e l y ,
12 // sub j e c t to the f o l l ow i ng r e s t r i c t i o n s :
13 //
14 // 1 . The o r i g i n o f t h i s so f tware must not be mis repre sented ;
15 // you must not c la im that you wrote the o r i g i n a l so f tware .
16 // I f you use t h i s so f tware in a product , an acknowledgment
17 // in the product documentation would be apprec ia ted but i s not r equ i r ed
.
18 //
19 // 2 . Altered source v e r s i on s must be p l a i n l y marked as such ,
20 // and must not be mis represented as being the o r i g i n a l so f tware .
21 //
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22 // 3 . This no t i c e may not be removed or a l t e r e d from any source







29 #inc lude " ResourcePath . hpp "
30 #import <Foundation/Foundation . h>
31
32 // //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
33 std : : s t r i n g resourcePath ( void )
34 {
35 NSAutoreleasePool ∗ pool = [ [ NSAutoreleasePool a l l o c ] i n i t ] ;
36
37 std : : s t r i n g rpath ;
38 NSBundle∗ bundle = [ NSBundle mainBundle ] ;
39
40 i f ( bundle == n i l ) {
41 #i f d e f DEBUG
42 NSLog(@" bundle i s n i l . . . thus no r e s ou r c e s path can be found . " ) ;
43 #end i f
44 } e l s e {
45 NSString∗ path = [ bundle resourcePath ] ;
46 rpath = [ path UTF8String ] + std : : s t r i n g ( " / " ) ;
47 }
48
49 [ pool dra in ] ;
50
51 re turn rpath ;
52 }
53
54 std : : s t r i n g currentPath ( void )
55 {
56 NSAutoreleasePool ∗ pool = [ [ NSAutoreleasePool a l l o c ] i n i t ] ;
57 NSFileManager ∗ f i l eManager ;
58 f i l eManager = [ [ NSFileManager a l l o c ] i n i t ] ;
59 [ pool dra in ] ;
60 NSURL ∗appFolder = [ [ [ NSBundle mainBundle ] bundleURL ]
URLByDeletingLastPathComponent ] ;




64 std : : s t r i n g getPathForResource ( )
65 {
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66 NSString ∗ f i l ePa t h = [ [ NSBundle mainBundle ] pathForResource :@" t e s t "
ofType :@" txt " ] ;
67 re turn std : : s t r i n g ( [ f i l ePa t h UTF8String ] ) ;
68 }
1 //
2 // Scene . hpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f Scene_hpp
10 #de f i n e Scene_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <SFML/Graphics . hpp>
14 #inc lude " PacketHandler . hpp "
15 #inc lude " SceneHandler . hpp "
16 #inc lude " ResourcePath . hpp "
17 #inc lude " . . / . . / Thesis−game−s e r v e r /Thesis−game−s e r v e r /OpCodes . hpp "
18
19 enum InputAction {
20 INPUT_NO_ACTION = 0 ,
21 INPUT_SUBMIT_NAME = 1 ,
22 INPUT_SUBMIT_GUESS = 2
23 } ;
24
25 c l a s s SceneHandler ;
26
27 c l a s s Scene {
28 pub l i c :
29 Scene ( SceneHandler ∗ sceneHandler , PacketHandler ∗packetHandler ) ;
30 v i r t u a l i n t Run ( s f : : RenderWindow & window) = 0 ;
31
32 protec ted :
33 SceneHandler ∗mSceneHandler ;
34 PacketHandler ∗mPacketHandler ;
35 s f : : Packet CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes opCode , bool
setAuthent icat ionHash = f a l s e ) ;
36 } ;
37
38 #end i f /∗ Scene_hpp ∗/
1 //




5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " Scene . hpp "
10
11 Scene : : Scene ( SceneHandler ∗ sceneHandler , PacketHandler ∗packetHandler ) :




15 s f : : Packet Scene : : CreatePacketWithOpCode (OpCodes opCode , bool
setAuthent icat ionHash ) {
16 s f : : Packet packet ;
17 packet << opCode ;
18 i f ( setAuthent icat ionHash ) {
19 i f ( th i s−>mSceneHandler−>HasVariable ( "HASH" ) ) {
20 packet << th i s−>mSceneHandler−>GetVariable ( "HASH" ) ;
21 } e l s e {
22 throw std : : runtime_error ( "HASH not found in map" ) ;
23 }
24 }
25 re turn packet ;
26 }
1 //
2 // SceneHandler . hpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #i f n d e f SceneHandler_hpp
10 #de f i n e SceneHandler_hpp
11
12 #inc lude <s td i o . h>
13 #inc lude <iostream>
14 #inc lude <unordered_map>
15 #inc lude <SFML/Graphics . hpp>
16 #inc lude " Scene . hpp "
17
18 c l a s s Scene ;
19
20 c l a s s SceneHandler {
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21 pr i va t e :
22 std : : unordered_map<int , Scene∗> mScenes ;
23 std : : unordered_map<std : : s t r i ng , std : : s t r i ng> mVariables ;
24
25 s f : : RenderWindow &mWindow;
26 i n t mCurrentScene = 0 ;
27 pub l i c :
28 SceneHandler ( s f : : RenderWindow &window) ;
29 ~SceneHandler ( ) ;
30 void DrawCurrentScene ( ) ;
31 void Reg i s t e rScene ( i n t sceneId , Scene ∗ scene ) ;
32 void SetScene ( i n t scene Id ) ;
33 void SetVar iab l e ( std : : s t r i n g key , std : : s t r i n g va r i ab l e ) ;
34 std : : s t r i n g GetVariable ( std : : s t r i n g key ) ;
35 bool HasVariable ( std : : s t r i n g key ) ;
36 } ;
37
38 #end i f /∗ SceneHandler_hpp ∗/
1 //
2 // SceneHandler . cpp
3 // Thesis−game
4 //
5 // Created by Samuli Lehtonen on 27/04/2019.
6 // Copyright c© 2019 Samuli Lehtonen . Al l r i g h t s r e s e rved .
7 //
8
9 #inc lude " SceneHandler . hpp "
10




15 SceneHandler : : ~ SceneHandler ( ) {
16 // Delete a l l s c ene s here
17 }
18
19 void SceneHandler : : Reg i s t e rScene ( i n t sceneId , Scene ∗ scene ) {
20 th i s−>mScenes [ s cene Id ] = scene ;
21 }
22
23 void SceneHandler : : DrawCurrentScene ( ) {
24 th i s−>mScenes [ th i s−>mCurrentScene]−>Run( th i s−>mWindow) ;
25 }
26
27 void SceneHandler : : SetScene ( i n t scene Id ) {




31 void SceneHandler : : Se tVar iab l e ( std : : s t r i n g key , std : : s t r i n g va r i ab l e ) {
32 th i s−>mVariables [ key ] = va r i ab l e ;
33 }
34
35 std : : s t r i n g SceneHandler : : GetVariable ( std : : s t r i n g key ) {
36 re turn th i s−>mVariables [ key ] ;
37 }
38
39 bool SceneHandler : : HasVariable ( std : : s t r i n g key ) {
40 t ry {
41 th i s−>mVariables . at ( key ) ;
42 re turn true ;
43 } catch ( std : : except ion & except ion ) {
44 re turn f a l s e ;
45 }
46 }
C Memory obfuscation benchmarking code
1 #inc lude <iostream>
2 #inc lude <chrono>
3
4 us ing namespace std : : chrono ;
5
6 template <typename T>
7 T ∗ SetVar iab l e (T ∗ currentVar iab l e , T value ) {
8 de l e t e cu r r en tVar i ab l e ;
9 T ∗newValue = new T( value ) ;
10 re turn newValue ;
11 }
12
13 void TestWithRelocation ( ) {
14 i n t ∗a = new in t (50) ;
15 high_reso lut ion_c lock : : time_point t1 = high_reso lut ion_c lock : : now( ) ;
16 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 1000000; i++) {
17 a = SetVar iab l e ( a , i ) ;
18 }
19 high_reso lut ion_c lock : : time_point t2 = high_reso lut ion_c lock : : now( ) ;
20 auto durat ion = duration_cast<microseconds >( t2 − t1 ) . count ( ) ;
21 std : : cout << " Test with r e l o c a t i o n : " << durat ion << std : : endl ;
22 }
23
24 void TestWithRelocationAndEncryption ( ) {
25 i n t ∗a = new in t (50) ;
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26 high_reso lut ion_c lock : : time_point t1 = high_reso lut ion_c lock : : now( ) ;
27 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 1000000; i++) {
28 ∗a = ∗a ^ 10 ; // Simple XOR operat i on to s imulate l i g h t encrypt ion
29 a = SetVar iab l e ( a , i ) ;
30 }
31 high_reso lut ion_c lock : : time_point t2 = high_reso lut ion_c lock : : now( ) ;
32 auto durat ion = duration_cast<microseconds >( t2 − t1 ) . count ( ) ;
33 std : : cout << " Test with r e l o c a t i o n and encrypt ion : " << durat ion << std
: : endl ;
34 }
35
36 void TestWithoutRelocation ( ) {
37 i n t a = 50 ;
38 high_reso lut ion_c lock : : time_point t1 = high_reso lut ion_c lock : : now( ) ;
39 f o r ( i n t i = 0 ; i < 1000000; i++) {
40 a = i ;
41 }
42 high_reso lut ion_c lock : : time_point t2 = high_reso lut ion_c lock : : now( ) ;
43 auto durat ion = duration_cast<microseconds >( t2 − t1 ) . count ( ) ;
44 std : : cout << " Test without r e l o c a t i o n : " << durat ion << std : : endl ;
45 }
46
47 i n t main ( i n t argc , const char ∗ argv [ ] ) {
48 TestWithRelocation ( ) ;
49 TestWithoutRelocation ( ) ;
50 TestWithRelocationAndEncryption ( ) ;
51
52 re turn 0 ;
53 }
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